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Building Solidarity Through Expansion
of NLRA Coverage: A Bluepyint o
Worker Empowerment
Marion Crain*
Three bulls for a long time pastured together. A Lion lay in am-
bush in the hope of making them his prey, but was afraid to attack
them while they kept together. Having at last by guileful speeches
succeeded in separating them, he attacked them without fear as they
fed alone, and feasted on them one by one at his own leisure.
Union is strength.1
INTRODUCTION
American labor law2 is in crisis. The dramatic decline in
the proportion of the labor force that is unionized 3 is a testa-
ment to the fact that labor law no longer serves the interests of
workers. Union leaders have called for the abolition of labor
law,4 scholars have suggested its reform,5 and Congress has
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
B.S., Cornell, 1980; J.D., U.C.L.A., 1983. I would like to thank Judge Arthur
Alarcon, Wythe Holt, Jeff Lewin, and Patrick McGinley for their comments
on earlier drafts of this Article, and Linda Gutsell, Leonard Copeland, and
Jeff Davis, WVU College of Law Class of 1991, for their research assistance. I
am especially grateful to Ken Matheny, WVU College of Law Class of 1989,
who offered an insightful critique concerning the ideas expressed in this
Article.
1. The Lion and the Three Bulls, in AESOP'S FABLES 159 (G. Townsend
trans. 1882).
2. The phrase "labor law" throughout this Article refers to the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988), and the body
of interpretive decisional law the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
"the Board") and the courts have developed under the NLRA.
3. The proportion of the working population that is unionized has de-
clined dramatically over the last four decades. Union Membership Declines to
16.8% of Workers in 1988, BLS Survey Shows, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 18,
at B-13 (Jan. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Membership Declines]. In 1975, unionized
workers comprised 28.9% of the nonagricultural workforce. STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987 (Table No. 692) 408. By 1982, that per-
centage had dropped to 21.9%. I& In 1988, unionized workers constituted only
16.8% of the workforce. Membership Declines, supra, at B-13.
4. See, e.g., Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 871,
871, 877 (1987) (UMWA President argues that labor law has become a "danger-
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held oversight hearings on the issue of labor law reform. 6
Although the decline in union membership is both cause and
effect of organized labor's lack of power,7 the drop in union
membership is more directly attributable to the law's inability
to adapt to our nation's shift to a service sector economy and
corresponding changes in the demographics of labor force par-
ticipation." More fundamentally, however, today's labor law
crisis is the inevitable consequence of the structural compo-
nents of labor law that operate to ensure the continued hierar-
ous farce" and should be abolished, and that labor should wage its battles in-
stead in the state courts and in political arenas); Kirkland Says Many Unions
Avoiding NLRB, 132 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 13 (Sept. 4, 1989) (reporting that
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland would prefer no law because current labor
law "forbids us to show solidarity and direct union support").
5. See, e.g., Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An
Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) [hereinafter Work-
place Democracy & Market Reconstruction]; Klare, The Labor-Management
Cooperation Debate.- A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 39, 39 (1988) [hereinafter The Labor-Management Corporation Debate];
Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerg-
ing Possibilities, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 73, 79 (1988); see also Getman, Is Labor
Law Doing Its Job?, 15 STETSON L. REV. 93, 93-94 (1985) (reporting widespread
disillusionment with labor law in the academic community).
6. See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON THE FAIL-
URE OF LABOR LAw - A BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN WORKERS 1-26 (Comm.
Print 1984) [hereinafter THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW]; Senate Labor Commit-
tee Holds Hearing on Organizing Rights under Taft-Hartley Act, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), No. 20, at A-l (Feb. 1, 1988) (reporting the Senate Labor Sub-
committee hearings on how the NLRA operates as an impediment to union or-
ganizing efforts). In addition, the Department of Labor initiated a five year
project entitled U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooper-
ation, B.L.M.R. REPr. No. 134 (1989), which examines whether labor law's ad-
versarial underpinnings conflict with emerging forms of management-worker
cooperation.
7. Because labor unions no longer possess strength in numbers, see supra
note 3, they lack financial support, economic power, and political clout.
8. A number of interacting forces have thwarted union organizing ef-
forts. First, some have suggested that a general decline in union strength was
inevitable once supervisors were excluded from NLRA coverage in the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947. See, e.g., Seitz, Lega, Legislative, and Managerial Re-
sponses to the Organization of Supervisory Employees in the 1940's, 28 AM. J.
LEG. HIsT. 199, 202 (1984) (noting that the Taft-Hartley Act's exclusion of su-
pervisors' unions from NLRA protection was a vital element in the reassertion
of capital's control of the shop floor). The growth of the service sector and
consequent increase in white collar workers - many of whom are ineligible
for union membership because of their mid-level supervisory roles - have ex-
acerbated the problem for unions. See Unions Vow to Regain Strength Despite
1987 Slip in Membership, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at A-9 (Feb. 9, 1988)
[hereinafter Unions Vow].
Second, labor's image problem has hampered its efforts to organize white
collar and professional employees. Many white collar employees view union
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chical organization of the workplace, stratification of the
laboring class, and disempowerment of workers.9
The distribution of power in our society now rests almost
entirely in the hands of a cadre of "elite" capital owners and
the managers who function as their ciphers. 10 The concentra-
tion of power and capital in fewer hands has facilitated a
shakeout in the economy, evidenced by the takeover mania of
membership as an impediment to advancement with their companies. I&i at A-
10.
Third, unions traditionally have been less successful in organizing women,
who are entering the workforce in increasing numbers. See Membership De-
clines, supra note 3, at B-13 (stating that in 1988, union membership rates for
women were 13% as compared with 20% for men).
Finally, the restructuring of the economy has caused employer "insecu-
rity." Firms that were willing to play "softball" with unions have now
"switched to hardball." Unions Vow, supra, at A-li. Simultaneously, employ-
ers have become increasingly aggressive in fighting off unionism. Id; see Wei-
ler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights To Sel-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1780-81 (1983)(documenting sharp rise in
number of unfair labor practices committed by employers, particularly termi-
nations for union support during organizing drives). The rapid growth of the
anti-union consultant industry is further evidence of increased management
resistance to unionization. See THE FAILURE OF LABOR LAW, supra note 6, at
4-9; SUBCOMIM. ON LABOR-MANAGFiENT RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON PRESSURES IN To-
DAY'S WORKPLACE 25-50 (Con. Print 1980) [hereinafter PRESSURES IN To-
DAY'S WORKPLACE]. The increased sophistication of employers in warding off
the threat of unionization has had some benign effects, including the develop-
ment of more enlightened management practices (i.e., due process systems and
better communications with employees). Unions Vow, supra, at A-l1. The
impact of these practices on union organization efforts, however, is powerful:
"'Unions have to convince employees that management is the bad guy, and
that's tough to do today."' Id (quoting Brian Gill, president of the non-union
division of the Printing Industries of America).
9. See Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REv.
841, 842 (1985). Most legal scholars "would probably agree that labor law helps
shape the reality it reflects." Sockell, The Future of Labor Law: A Mismatch
Between Statutory Interpretation and Industrial Reality?, 30 B.C.L. REv. 987,
989 n.7 (1989).
10. Half of the wealth assets in this country are owned by the top 6% of
the population. P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, RISKING LIBERATION:
MIDDLE CLASS POwERLESSmNEss AND SOCIAL. HEROIsM 82 (1988). Further, own-
ership of the means of production - the wealth assets that confer economic
power - is even more concentrated. Sixty percent of the productive assets are
owned by 1% of the population, and 90% of the population owns no assets of
this type at all. Id at 61, 82. Because ownership of the means of production is
accomplished through the corporate form of organization, and corporations are
run by a small cadre of top-level corporate management, an extremely small
segment of the population has control over many aspects of our lives. Id.; see
also Hacker, Introduction: Corporate America, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-
OVER 9-10 (A. Hacker ed. 1964)(asserting that "the fulcrum of corporate power
is the investment decision" that a small handful of corporate owners make).
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the 1980s and attendant corporate restructuring and liquidation
of assets.11 In recent years, unionized and non-unionized em-
ployees alike have become painfully aware of their vulnerabil-
ity to unilateral management action.' 2
In short, the centralization of power in the hands of capital
owners has resulted in an unhealthy level of economic depen-
dence of all employees on their employers. More than twenty
years ago, Lawrence Blades pointed out that this concentration
of employer power poses a serious threat to individual freedom
in a "nation of employees" dependent upon their employers for
"the substance of life."'13
Workers have always been vulnerable to abuses of em-
ployer power because the workplace has traditionally assumed
a hierarchical structure in which workers are subordinate to
capital owners. The law reflected this structure from its early
days, when the work relation was characterized as a master-ser-
vant relationship.14 In recognition of the servant's vulnerability
to discharge, the early English law developed a rule that intro-
duced some measure of employment security to the master-ser-
vant relationship. The "English rule," articulated by Sir
William Blackstone, provided that all employment was pre-
sumed to be for one year.'5 American law rejected the English
11. See Trevor, Hostile Takeovers in Perspective, 55 VITAL SPEECHES OF
THE DAY 550, 551 (1989) (describing in numerical and statistical terms the
scope of merger and acquisition activity in the United States since 1986).
12. See supra note 3; Blum, Prospects for Organization of White-Collar
Workers, 87 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 125, 126 (1964) (arguing that non-unionized
white collar workers are increasingly aware of their lack of protection from
unilateral management action); Munro, Takeovers, in VITAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY, supra note 11, at 470, 473 (discussing the harmful effects of takeovers on
the careers of middle managers); Unions Vow, supra note 8, at A-10 (reporting
that job security is needed for white collar employees faced with potential ter-
mination as a result of takeovers and mergers).
13. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom- On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404 (1967)
(quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis
omitted)).
14. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, CO MMENTARIES *410 (describing the master-
servant relationship); see also Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, 28 BuFFALo L. REv. 205, 272-311 (1979) (characterizing Blackstone's
view of all relationships between persons as restricted to relations of formal
inequality, and criticizing Blackstone's assumption that a hierarchically or-
dered society was necessary to uphold valued institutions such as royalty, the
church, and the family).
15. 1 W. BLACxSTONE, supra note 14, at *415. The rule provided:
If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the
law construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural
equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him
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rule in favor of the employment at will doctrine.' 6 With the
introduction of employment at will in American jurisprudence,
employees were placed at the mercy of the employer's absolute
power to terminate employment.17
Eventually, courts and legislatures took an interest in pro-
tecting employees against some of the troubling consequences
of the imbalance of power between employers and employees.
The harsh impact of the at will doctrine has resulted in an in-
creasing judicial preoccupation with the problem of abusive ter-
minations of workers by employers. 18 Legislative attention has
throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well as
when there is work as when there is not ....
I The English rule was further augmented by limitations imposed by the
Statute of Labourers, 1562, 5 Eliz. ch.4. The Statute of Labourers introduced
the concept of "just cause" termination to Anglo law, and provided an addi-
tional limitation to the employer's power to discharge. Id; 1 W. BLACKsTONE,
supra note 14, at *426; see also Note, Unjust Dismissal of Employees at Wilk
Are Disclaimers a Final Solution?, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 537-38 (1986-87)
(discussing historical foundations of employment at will doctrine).
16. H. WOOD, A TRFATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERvANT § 134, at
272 (1878), cited in Note, supra note 15, at 538 n.41 and accompanying text.
The New York Court of Appeals first adopted the rule in 1895. See Martin v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895).
17. Attempts to protect workers from discharge and other workplace
abuses were rejected in favor of the legal doctrine of liberty of contract. This
doctrine assumed a market in which employers bargained individually with
workers to arrive at employment contracts that served the interests of both
parties. See, eg., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-73 (1908) (striking
down statute making it a criminal offense for an employer to discharge an em-
ployee because of membership in a labor union, reasoning that it was the em-
ployer's right to set the terms of service and to refuse business relations with
any employee regardless of whether the "refusal rests upon reason, or is the
result of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice"); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 53 (1905) (striking down state law proscribing maximum hours for labor in
bakeries because the right to contract for the purchase of labor is a liberty
right the fourteenth amendment protects). Some scholars viewed the liberty
of contract notion as a blatant legal fiction, a form of "mechanical jurispru-
dence" that camouflaged a view of the employer-employee relationship that
had become outdated with the social changes wrought by the industrial revolu-
tion. See, e.g., Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 463 (1909). Pound
argued in particular:
Legislation designed to give laborers some measure of practical inde-
pendence, which, if allowed to operate, would put them in a position
of reasonable equality with their masters, is said by courts, because it
infringes on a theoretical equality, to be insulting to their manhood
and degrading, to put them under guardianship, to create a class of
statutory laborers, and to stamp them as imbeciles.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
18. Judicial creativity produced the v.ongful discharge doctrine. Predi-
cated on tort and contract theories, wrongful discharge forms of action provide
modern employees with a means of redress for discharge, although they do not
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been directed primarily toward improving the working condi-
tions of employees.19  These judicial and legislative efforts,
however, are predicated upon a hierarchical workplace struc-
ture; they assume the need of dependent, vulnerable employees
for protection from abusive exercises of power by employers.
The sole attempt to alter the hierarchical structure of the
workplace directly, through law, is the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA).20 The NLRA purported to establish a sys-
tem of industrial democracy that would, through the vehicles of
worker collective organization and bargaining, offer workers
the opportunity to empower themselves.21 Employees covered
address other abusive exercises of power by employers. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 317, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 919, 927 (1981)
(holding that discharge of 32-year employee who had been promised a "secure
future" if he did a good job, and who had received consistent raises and posi-
tive evaluations, was grounds for breach of implied contract action);
Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 189-90, 344 P.2d 25,
27-28 (1959) (holding that discharge for employee's refusal to perjure himself
before a state legislative committee as instructed by his employer gave rise to
a tort-based action for wrongful discharge); see generally M. ROTHSTEIN, A.
KNAPP & L. LIEBMAN, EmPLOYMENT LAw 738-802 (1987) (examining limita-
tions case law engrafted on an employer's right to discharge employees);
Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 6 n.30
(1984) (listing states that recognize a public policy theory of liability for
wrongful discharge and discussing other theories of wrongful discharge); An-
notation, Modern Status of Rule that Employer May Discharge At-Will Em-
ployee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4TH 544, 553 (1982) (discussing case law that
recognizes public policy-based and contractual limitations on discharge).
19. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988)
(regulating wages and hours); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (establishing safety requirements in the workplace);
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (prohibiting gender discrimination in
the establishment of wage rates); Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) (providing protection for employee interests in
retirement and benefit plans); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifica-
tion Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988) (requiring notification of plant
closings); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009
(1988) (restricting polygraph testing of employees); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (forbid-
ding employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, religion, or
national origin). State legislatures have been equally active in regulating the
employment relationship. See Role of the States in Labor Relations, 4 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 708 at 1:1 (Mar. 14, 1988).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
21. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (stating that "protection by law of the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively... restor[es] equality of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees"). The use of the word "re-
stores" here is troubling. Its usage assumes a mythical time when such
equality really did exist; equality of bargaining power obviously cannot be "re-
stored" if it was never present. The notion probably harkens back to the pre-
viously rejected "liberty of contract" theories. See supra note 17.
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by the NLRA, however, have not experienced the empower-
ment that the Act promised. Difficulty in organizing workers
has severely hobbled union efforts to enlarge or equalize bar-
gaining power.
A major legal barrier to union organizing efforts is the ex-
clusion of middle-level employeese from NLRA coverage. Ap-
parently, "Congress . . . did not intend for the lot of the
supervisor to be an easy one."23 The NLRA does not protect
middle-level employees; it excludes from its definition of a cov-
ered "employee" supervisors,2 managers,? and confidential
employees with a labor nexus.2 Protection against discharge is
available under other federal statutes only on specified discrim-
ination grounds,27 and it appears unlikely that a federal "just
cause for discharge" statute will be enacted anytime soon.28
22. The phrase "middle-level employees" refers to supervisors, managers,
and confidential employees with a labor nexus, as the Act defines those cate-
gories of employees. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. For a sta-
tistical summary by occupation of the employees who fall within that group,
see Sockell, supra note 9, at 995-98.
23. Rasmussen v. NLRB, 875 F.2d 1390, 1393-94 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that NLRB properly upheld union discipline of supervisor-member for per-
forming bargaining unit work during strike; court recognized supervisor's di-
lemma - he could be fired for honoring the picket line, but union could
discipline him for crossing it).
24. NLRA 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). See infra notes 93-105 and accompanying
text.
25. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974). See infra notes
106-49 and accompanying text.
26. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S.
170, 190 (1981). See infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34 (1988) (forbidding employment discrimination on the basis of age);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 &
Supp V 1987) (forbidding employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, gender, religion, national origin).
28. The proposed "Employment Termination Act" (ETA), which the Na-
tional Commissioners on Uniform State Laws continues to consider, is under
heavy attack by plaintiff and management lawyers alike. Employment Termi-
nation Law, 5 Ind. Emp. Rts. (BNA) (9A Lab. Rel. Rep.) No. 3, at 4 (March 13,
1990) [hereinafter Termination Law]. The Act would impose just cause stan-
dards for termination following a one-year probationary period, and calls for
arbitrators to enforce the standard, rather than courts or administrative tribu-
nals. Draft Uniform Employment Termination Act, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
No. 62, at 540:21 (May 1990). One commentator, plaintiff's attorney Joseph A.
Golden, has said that "everyone hates" the Act, and thato"no uniform or model
law will pass." Pros and Cons of Wrongful Discharge Legislation, National
Labor Policy, Are Weighed by ABA Panelists, 131 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 554,
556 (Aug. 28, 1989) (commenting on an earlier draft).
Alternatively, former NLRB Chairman Edward Miller has proposed an
amendment to the NLRA that would make unjust discharge an unfair labor
1990]
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Court-developed wrongful discharge doctrine provides, at best,
protection for employees at the highest end of the earnings
scale 29 who fit within one of the recognized theories of wrong-
ful discharge law, and are fortunate enough to live in a jurisdic-
tion that recognizes the particular theory.30
The shift from an industrial to a service economy has dra-
matically increased the proportion of middle management jobs
in the workforce.31 Simultaneously, the working class has ex-
perienced a loss of power.32 As more and more employees
work in areas other than direct production, bureaucracy has
taken over, further stratifying workers through impersonal
"company policies" and division of labor into specialized posi-
tions circumscribed by complex rules.s Hierarchical workplace
practice. Termination Law, supra, at 4. To be meaningful, such an amend-
ment also requires a change in the definition of "employee" to include manag-
ers, supervisors, and confidential employees - but only for the limited
purpose of protection under the proposed unjust discharge provision. This
proposal drew sharp criticism from the ABA's Developing Labor Law Com-
mittee. Id.
29. See Note, Protecting Employees At Will From Wrongful Discharge:
The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1940 (1983) (arguing that
managerial employees who bring wrongful discharge claims are those who pos-
sess greater resources). The wrongful discharge remedy has limited utility for
women, minorities, and others in protected classes, whose average wage is
likely to be at the lower end of the earnings scale; the size of the typical award
in a wrongful discharge case is directly related to the plaintiff's pre-termina-
tion salary. See Rand Study Suggests Employers Would Be Wise to Settle
Wrongful Discharge Suits Before Trial, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 182, at A-
10 (Sept. 20, 1988) (summarizing results of J. DERTOUzos, E. HOLLAND & P.
EBENER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINA-
TION (1988)). Plaintiffs' lawyers in wrongful discharge suits typically charge a
40% contingency fee. Id- There thus exists little financial incentive for plain-
tiffs' attorneys to take wrongful discharge cases for plaintiffs at the low end of
the earnings scale, whose awards are likely to be quite small.
30. See Employment At WilL State Rulings Chart, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) No. 50, at 505:51-52 (August, 1989) (summarizing state adoption of vari-
ous theories of wrongful discharge law); see also infra notes 258-60 and accom-
panying text (discussing wrongful discharge law).
31. Sockell, supra note 9, at 995-96.
32. Id.; see Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, in THE CORPORA.
TION TAxEovER 233-42 (A. Hacker ed. 1964) (discussing the growing number of
white-collar professional and technical workers who are resistant to unioniza-
tion; as the number of these white-collar workers rises in proportion to blue-
collar workers, the bargaining power of existing unions is correspondingly
weakened).
33. See P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 32; see
also J. GALBRArrH, THE NEW INDUsTRIAL STATE 59-71 (1967) (arguing that the
technostructure of the modern corporation has created a large class of mid-
level professionals and technicians who are both, and yet neither, boss nor em-
ployee in the strict sense).
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organization is reinforced by bureaucratization. The law's
alignment of middle-level employees with capital owners and
the corresponding isolation of middle-level employees from the
rank and file maintain this structure.34
This Article argues that collective organization and collec-
tive bargaining offer the most promising avenue for the em-
powerment of all workers, both rank-and-file and middle-level
employees. Statutory. protection schemes and wrongful dis-
charge doctrine are inadequate responses to the need of mid-
dle-level employees for protection from the abusive exercise of
employer power. Because neither ensures worker participation
in workplace governance, neither serves as more than a band-
aid for the continuing problem of unequal bargaining power.
Furthermore, these remedies, available on an individual
basis, only maintain the stratification of workers and ensure
their ultimate powerlessness. With powerlessness comes alien-
ation.35 Worker alienation is a direct consequence of the hier-
archical organization of the workplace and the corresponding
lack of opportunity for meaningful employee input into the
control and direction of the enterprise.36
I therefore add my voice to those who have proposed re-
forms of labor law that support workplace democracy as the
means to worker empowerment, 37 and propose an amendment
to the NLRA that would expand its coverage vertically to in-
clude all supervisory, managerial, and confidential employees.-3
34. J. GALBRArrH, supra note 33, at 59-71.
35. See infra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 322 and accompanying text; Workplace Democracy &
Market Reconstruction, supra note 5, at 4 (contending that collective bargain-
ing promotes employee participation and autonomy, and, hence, self-determi-
nation); Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee
Supervision of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1988) (citing research
indicating that employees who have a higher degree of participation in a firm's
decision-making processes are more productive and motivated in their work).
37. See, e.g., Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note
5, at 3 (proposing an agenda for the next generation of labor law reform,
founded upon the expansion of democracy in the workplace and accomplished,
in part, through market reconstruction supporting collective bargaining). See
also infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (discussing the injection of de-
mocracy into the workplace as the Wagner Act's implicit goal).
38. I characterize my proposal as a proposal for "vertical" expansion be-
cause I suggest that the NLRA be expanded to cover employees who hold posi-
tions that are "higher" in the workplace hierarchy than those currently
covered by the NLRA. I also favor horizontal expansion of NLRA coverage to
workers who occupy positions in the workplace hierarchy that are comparable
in status to those covered employees hold, including agricultural laborers and
domestic workers, who are nevertheless explicitly excluded from coverage by
1990]
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My proposal is intended as a first step toward the goal of em-
powering workers; even were it implemented, the NLRA con-
tains many other barriers to worker empowerment.39
Restructuring the way we define "labor" so as to diminish
worker stratification is critical, however, if a redistribution of
power - both economic and political - is to be achieved.40
The vast gap in power and function that exists between those
who control capital and those who labor suggests that middle-
level employees and rank-and-file employees are in fact part of
one larger class.4 ' A shift in the law's focus to recognize the
similarities among categories of workers, rather than a continu-
ing preoccupation with the differences between them, would re-
vitalize unions, and enhance the possibility of achieving the
joint control over business enterprise that the Wagner Act
envisioned.4
Part I of the Article lays out the goals of labor law as they
§ 2(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). Horizontal expansion of cover-
age, like vertical expansion, promotes solidarity and ultimately, worker em-
powerment. See Lewin, "Representatives of Their Own Choosing:" Practical
Considerations in the Selection of Bargaining Representatives for Seasonal
Farmworkers, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 732, 733 n.4 (1976) (stating that "agricultural
unions may provide the only effective political voice and social community for
people who are often transient and powerless vis-a-vis the dominant institu-
tions of the society they feed"). The hierarchical organization of the work-
place and the increase in bureaucratization, however, make vertical expansion
a priority.
39. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 260-61
(1939) (stating that sit-down strike is not protected concerted activity); NLRB
v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (holding that
permanent replacement of economic strikers is lawful). See generally Klare,
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 301-03, 322-25 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter Judicial Deradicalization] (discussing the Supreme Court's limitation of
the Wagner Act).
40. Although my proposal contains a deceptively simple alteration to the
existing structure of labor law, if adopted it has the potential to alter the ine-
qualities of wealth and power that existing labor law legitimates. Cf. Stone,
supra note 5, at 81 (examining the prospects for true worker participation
within the present regulatory scheme). The existing structure of the NLRA,
which excludes middle-level employees from coverage, serves to make the sta-
tus quo in the workplace and in society look natural, inevitable, and even be-
nign, and makes fundamental change seem impossible. Our reluctance to
discuss inequalities of economic and political power and to recognize problems
of capital structure is itself a major barrier to worker empowerment. See
Atleson, supra note 9, at 841 (stating that concentration of capital in fewer
hands seriously alters the underlying assumptions of federal labor policy, and
reluctance to discuss the problem exacerbates it).
41. See infra notes 173-202 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 270-332 and accompanying text.
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were originally conceived by the proponents of the Wagner
Act.4 3 Part II details the attempt, by Congress and the
Supreme Court, to distinguish between "employees" covered by
the NLRA and those to whom its protections are not extended,
and who therefore become aligned with the employer by de-
fault.44 Part III provides a critique of those judicial and legisla-
tive line-drawing efforts in light of the rationales identified in
Part II.45 Part IV examines the impact that excluding middle-
level employees from coverage of the NLRA has on federal la-
bor policy.4 Finally, Part V discusses and defends my proposed
solution. That solution includes statutory amendments deleting
the existing exemption of supervisors from coverage under the
NLRA, eliminating the requirement that professionals be seg-
regated in separate units from the rank and file, and an explicit
overruling of the judicial doctrines that exclude managerial em-
ployees and confidential employees with a labor nexus from the
Act's coverage.47
I. THE WAGNER ACT: CREATION OF A STRUCTURE
FOR WORKER EMPOWERMENT
The Wagner Act, passed by Congress in 1935,48 was the
first in the triumvirate of major legislation that together com-
prise the NLRA. 49 The Wagner Act was the product of more
than a century of struggle by workers to improve their working
conditions. At the time, the Act was viewed as an industrial
Magna Charta for labor, an innovation that "brought American
workers out of the industrial state of nature,"i and secured for
workers "the right of freedom of competition in a competitive
economy." 5' The Wagner Act's two explicit goals were reduc-
tion of industrial strife, and improvement of the bargaining,
43. See infra notes 48-80 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 81-168 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 169-269 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 270-335 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 336-83 and accompanying text.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
49. The other two statutes are the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, codified as 29
U.S.C. § 141 (1988), and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, codified as 29 U.S.C.
§§ 153, 158-60, 164, 186, 187, 401 (1988).
50. Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archi-
bald Cox, 4 INDus. REL. L.J. 483, 483 (1981).
51. W. OBERER, K. HANsLowE, J. ANDERsEN & T. HEiNsz, CASES AND




and therefore purchasing, power of employees.52 In addition,
the Act's one unstated goal was the maintenance and enhance-
ment of political democracy through the injection of democracy
into the workplace.53 T"he Act's drafters concluded that these
goals could best be attained through collective organization and
collective bargaining.-
The goals of the NLRA are laudable and were achievable
52. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Section 1 states, in pertinent part:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of own-
ership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of com-
merce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
For a more detailed description of the goals of the Wagner Act, see J. ATLE-
SON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 40-43 (1983).
53. Senator Wagner, sponsor of the Wagner Act, believed: "[D]emocracy
in industry must be based on the same principles as democracy in government.
Majority rule, with all its imperfections, is the best protection of workers'
rights, just as it is the surest guaranty of political liberty that mankind has yet
discovered." 79 CONG. REC. S7571 (daily ed. May 15, 1935)(statement of Senator
Wagner). Commenting later on the underlying rationale of the NLRA, Sena-
tor Wagner elaborated-
The principles of my proposal were... founded upon the accepted
facts that we must have democracy in industry as well as in govern-
ment; that democracy in industry means fair participation by those
who work in the decisions vitally affecting their lives and livelihood;
and that the workers in our great mass production industries can en-
joy this participation only if allowed to organize and bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1937, at 20, col. 1.
54. Section 1 of the Act embodies this conclusion:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employ-
ees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from in-
jury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce
by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest,
by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or
other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to elim-
inate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and con-
ditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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under the Wagner Act as originally drafted.s However, the po-
tential under the Wagner Act for collective organization of all
workers - including supervisors, managers, and confidential
employees - is central to the achievement of the Act's goals.
The exclusion of supervisory, managerial, and confidential em-
ployees accomplished by the Taft-Hartley Act and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions ensures that the NLRA will fail to
keep its promise to workers.as Consequently, the NLRA now
perpetuates the existing hierarchical social structure, both in
the workplace and in our political system.5 7
A. INDUSTRIAL PEACE
The primary goal of the Wagner Act was to ensure indus-
trial peace, which in turn would avoid interruptions of com-
merce attendant to industrial strife.aS This goal was central to
the Act for two reasons. It was the "Constitutional hook upon
which Congressional jurisdiction was hung."59 Concern with
the constitutionality of the Wagner Act arose because the
Supreme Court had declared its predecessor statute, the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), unconstitutional in
1935.60 The Wagner Act's exposition of the industrial peace
goal in its statement of purpose saved that statute from being
55. See Judicial Deradicalization, supra note 39 (stating that the Wagner
Act's radical possibilities were not realized). Most labor law scholars today re-
main committed to collective organization and collective bargaining. See, e.g.,
Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note 5, at 4 n.1 (dis-
cussing the commitment of even the critical school of labor law scholars to col-
lective bargaining).
56. See Willborn, Industrial Democracy and The National Labor Rela-
tions Act. A Preliminary Inquiry, 25 B.C.L. REv. 725, 742 (1984) (arguing that
the NLRA model fails as democracy because of its exclusion, in part, of super-
visors, managers, and confidential employees, for whom it does not provide
representation).
57. See Klare, Labor Law As Ideology: Toward A New Historiography of
Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDus. RErL L.J. 450, 452 (1981) (contending that
labor law articulates an ideology that aims to legitimate and justify hierarchy
and domination in the workplace, and has evolved an institutional architecture
that reinforces this hierarchy) [hereinafter Labor Law as Ideology]. A law
fashioned by the elite is bound to reinforce the status quo. E. ROGERs & F.
SHOEMAKER, COMMUNICATION OF INNOVATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL AP-
PROACH 340-41 (2d ed. 1971).
58. Section 1 of the Act makes this clear. See supra note 52.
59. W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE, J. ANDERSEN & T. HEINsz, supra note 51,
at 116.
60. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935). The
Wagner Act was passed in July 1935. See W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE, J. AN-
DERSEN & T. HEINsz, supra note 51, at 115.
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declared unconstitutional. 61 In addition, this goal made the Act
politically feasible because of its appeal to employers.
The Act appealed to employers because it was designed to
reduce the incidence of strikes. The Act provided employees
with an outlet for their frustrations by sanctioning collective
bargaining through their representative, the union. In addition,
the Wagner Act endowed unions with sufficient leverage to en-
able them to press successfully some of their demands by im-
posing on employers a duty to bargain in good faith, and by
preventing employers from committing unfair labor practices. 62
If industrial peace is defined simply as the absence of
strikes, the NLRA has been extremely effective in achieving
the goal of industrial peace. In 1988, there were only forty ma-
jor work stoppages in the United States, the lowest number in
four decades.63
B. EMPOWERMENT OF WORKERS
The second explicit goal of the Act was to increase the bar-
gaining power of employees. This was in fact the impetus be-
hind the Act.M Independent unions, which would insist on a
more equitable distribution of profits, would enhance worker
61. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the
Supreme Court stated:
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making
their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their ac-
tivities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations
constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when
it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing
consequences of industrial war?
Md at 41.
62. See A. Cox, D. BOx & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR
LAW 84-85 (10th ed. 1986). Whether the Act actually reduced the incidence of
strikes is a matter of some debate. Compare id. (stating that the Act reduced
strikes and other forms of industrial unrest through establishment of collec-
tive bargaining) with J. ATLESON, supra note 52, at 43 (stating that "New Deal
legislation seems to have encouraged rather than lessened the incidence of
strikes").
63. Geoghegan, Glory Days, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 29, 1989, at 18. Ge-
oghegan's assertion is apparently based on statistics the U.S. Department of
Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics compiled. The Department now only col-
lects data on "major" work stoppages (strikes or lockouts that involve 1000 or
more workers and last a full shift or longer). See, e.g., 112 MONTHLY LAB.
REv. 64, 90 (Table No. 30) (Dec. 1989). Geoghegan attributes this decline to
the risk of permanent job loss that strikers face under the NLRB's interpreta-
tion of the Act. Geoghegan, supra, at 19.
64. Cf. A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, supra note 62, at 82 (discussing the
impetus behind the NLRA).
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purchasing power, and ultimately strengthen the economy.6 5 In
short, the Act was seen by some as an anti-Depression device
by which unions would raise wage rates and pump money into
the economy.6
James Atleson has also theorized that the Wagner Act was
Congress's attempt to simultaneously revive the economy and
enhance government power over capital owners, who were be-
coming increasingly powerful as wealth became more concen-
trated. Atleson views the Act as an attempt to harness
employee power as a tool in the state's effort to restrict corpo-
rate power.67
Whatever Congress's motive in enacting it, the Wagner Act
did present workers with a route to economic empowerment.
Unionized workers have achieved dramatic improvements in
wages and in their standards of living.68
C. INDusTRLAL DEMOCRACY
The implicit goal of the Wagner Act - to inject democracy
into the workplace - renders labor law a mini-model of a rep-
resentative democracy that "promises the same rewards and
confronts the same problems as its parent and archetype, lib-
eral democracy." 69 The Wagner Act's vision of workplace de-
mocracy was premised on collective representation of workers.
Such collective representation is critical to the creation of a fair
"private law" through collective bargaining.70 Many have
65. Atleson, supra note 9, at 841 n.2.
66. J. ATLESON, supra note 52, at 41 (footnotes omitted).
67. See i. at 41, 43. According to Atleson, economic crises trigger pres-
sure from workers on capital at a time when capital is least equipped to resist
such pressure; the state naturally takes advantage of this circumstance to ex-
pand its power. Id. at 43. An unfortunate byproduct of the government's ini-
tial support of collective bargaining was that labor's postwar success in
creating a private welfare system through collective bargaining exacerbated
the problems of standard minimalism and market segmentation; unions, be-
cause of their success, saw less need to press government for a universal wel-
fare system. Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note 5, at
38.
68. See Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note 5, at
38.
69. Willborn, supra note 56, at 725.
70. See, e.g., Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note
5 at 3-4; Harper, supra note 36, at 4, 10; The Labor-Management Cooperation
Debate, supra note 5, at 70; cf. Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 57, at 452
(arguing that collective bargaining law has been systematically fashioned to al-
low workers only a modicum of democratic participation, thereby eliciting
worker consent to the non-democratic, hierarchical structure of the work-
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praised collective bargaining, both because a democratic order-
ing of the workplace is seen as more "fair," and because work-
place democracy supports political democracy.7'
For centuries, political thinkers have promoted the estab-
lishment of industrial democracy as a means of advancing polit-
ical democracy.7 2  In 1797, Albert Gallatin, President
Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, asserted that "[t]he dem-
ocratic process on which this nation was founded should not be
restricted to the political process, but should be applied to the
industrial operation as well."73 Alexis de Tocqueville expressed
similar views in the mid-nineteenth century. He believed that
meaningful participation in the "minor affairs" of life was nec-
essary if democracy was to retain its meaning.7 4 Modern writ-
ers also have defended collective bargaining and the concept of
workplace democracy because these institutions contribute to
political democracy.7 5
Contemporary scholars also defend the democratic aspects
of collective bargaining because it promotes worker self-actuali-
zation.7 6 A corollary to this idea is the notion that participatory
place); Willborn, supra note 56, at 742 (arguing that NLRA model has failed to
promote industrial democracy).
71. J. ATLESON, supra note 52, at 41. Atleson notes, however, that Sena-
tor Wagner's devotion to workplace democracy must be viewed with some
skepticism. Wagner was interested in preserving political democracy in the
face of the "great peril" that Communism was believed to pose to American
democracy in 1935. I& at 42.
72. The apparent disinterest of a large portion of the population in the se-
lection of our leadership is cause for considerable concern by supporters of de-
mocracy. Voter turnout during the 1988 Presidential election hit its lowest
point in 64 years: only 50.1% of the population cast votes. Cook, Turnout Hits
64-Year Low in Presidential Race, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 135 (1989). The de-
cline of institutions that have spurred turnout, such as organized labor, has
been specifically identified as a cause of the sparse turnout. Id. Democratic
consultant Mark Mellman explains voter cynicism and apathy about the polit-
ical process this way: "'There's a sense that the political system is out of [vot-
ers'] control on one hand and not responsive on the other."' Id.
73. J. CORT, CHRmTLN SocIALisM 331 (1988) (quoting Albert Gallatin).
74. See J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 66-67 (1951) (quoting DE Toc-
QuEvnLE DEMOCRACY IN AmERICA 341-42 (1862)).
75. See, e.g., Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note
5, at 4.
76. See, e.g., The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate, supra note 5, at
44. Karl Klare describes the role of work in self-actualization as follows:
Where once work was seen as a religious duty... it is now increas-
ingly understood as one of the central opportunities in life to grow, to
experience autonomy from and connectedness with others, and to ac-
quire respect .... [T]he goal is active self-realization in work, an ex-
perience of work that is developmental, that enables one freely to
actualize one's abilities to the fullest extent possible.
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democracy combats feelings of alienation and apathy.77 The ul-
timate consequence of reducing feelings of alienation is to in-
crease productivity and efficiency.78 Employees who feel
personally invested in the enterprise because they have a real
voice in its operation will be more productive.79 Ultimately, la-
bor's share of the pie may increase without diminishing capi-
tal's share.80
77. See E. FROMM, THE SANE SOCIETY 270-86 (1955) (stating that worker
alienation can be overcome if workers have influence over the individual work
situation and over the entire enterprise).
78. See Crain, Expanded Employee Drug Detection Programs and the Pub-
lic Good. Big Brother At the Bargaining Table, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1286, 1294
(1989). Worker self-actualization and worker self-esteem seem inextricably in-
tertwined. Affording workers opportunities to self-actualize at work is likely
to augment their self-esteem. Correspondingly, self-esteem is dependent on
being capable of influencing one's environment. See W. RYAN, BLAMING THE
VICTIM 159 (1971). The exercise of power, in other words, is a condition for
self-esteem and full humanity. I& at 159-60. Ryan notes that a number of re-
ports suggest that acting as a group in one's own behalf tends to increase feel-
ings of confidence, effectiveness, and well-being. Id. at 160.
79. Harper, supra note 36, at 47. Harper cites research indicating that em-
ployees who have a higher degree of participation in a firm's decision-making
process are more productive, more satisfied, and motivated in their work. I&i
at 46-47 nn.146-52.
80. Harper also suggests that employee control over a firm might alter the
culture of the workplace, particularly the desires of the workers. I at 47-48.
Harper explains:
[DI]emocratic employee control of the firm can nurture ideals of
equality among laborers. It can also generate firm loyalty, resulting
in an emphasis on job security rather than maximum pay. Perhaps
most significantly, democratic employee control could eventually re-
sult in the redesign of jobs to give more workers greater discretion
over their own work effort. This discretion, in turn, could teach em-
ployees to place more value on work satisfaction than on their mone-
tary compensation. In sum, a collective choice of employee control
may constitute a decision by employees to change themselves and
their desires as human beings.
Id. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
Although I agree with many of Harper's predictions concerning the posi-
tive consequences of increased worker participation in decision-making, my
philosophical base differs fundamentally from Harper's. Although I believe
that productivity will increase as a result of increased participation by workers
in decision-making, the potential for increased profit for capital is not a predi-
cate to my advocacy of worker participation. For example, I disagree with
Harper's implicit assumption that there exists a particular "share" of the prof-
its to which capital is entitled. See id at 47.
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II. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN CAPITAL AND
LABOR
A. WHO WAS PROTECTED BY THE WAGNER ACT?
The Wagner Act did not discriminate between rank-and-
file workers and their supervisors. The Act conferred privileges
and benefits principally on "employees." 8' Section 2(3) of the
Act adopted a terse and circular definition of the term "em-
ployee": "[t]he term 'employee' shall include any employee
... "82 However, section 2(2) defined an "employer" as "any
person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indi-
rectly ..... 83 Thus, the issue early arose whether foremen,
who were responsible for administering discipline and initiating
recommendations for promotions and demotions, were "em-
ployees" within the protective scope of the Act.
After some vacillation over whether supervisory employees
were entitled to organize,84 the NLRB determined that fore-
men were entitled to organize and thus could constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.8 5 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision in Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NTLRB.86
The Packard Court reasoned that the context of the Wag-
ner Act left "no room for a construction... [that would] deny
the organizational privilege to employees because they act in
the interest of an employer."87 The Court acknowledged the
adoption of the doctrine of respondeat superior in section 2(2),
but pointed to the reality of the conflict that exists for all em-
ployees between their obligation to further the interests of
81. Section 7, the heart of the NLRA, provides: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection .... " NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
82. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
83. NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).
84. Compoare Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 968 (1942) (hold-
ing that supervisory employees may organize in an independent union) and
Godchaux Sugar, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874, 879 (1942) (holding that supervisory
employees may organize in a union affiliated with a larger rank-and-file
union) with Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733, 741-42 (1943) (finding no
unit appropriate for the organization of supervisory employees). The Board at
no time suggested that supervisors were not "employees" covered by the
NLRA. See Soss Mfg. Co. & Republic Steel Corp., 56 N.L.R.B. 348, 349 (1944).
85. Packard Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 26 (1945), enforced, NLRB v.
Packard Motor Car Co., 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), qff'd, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
86. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
87. Id. at 488.
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their employer and their very human commitment to advancing
their own individual interests as employees.ss The Court also
refused to adopt the employer's argument that unionization of
foremen was especially troublesome because it created a divi-
sion of loyalty for foremen and forced them to serve "two mas-
ters" - the union and the employer - resulting ultimately in
poor labor-management relations.8 9
Justice Douglas authored a powerful dissent9" He worried
that the majority's decision obliterated the line between man-
agement and labor.91 In an oft-quoted passage from that dis-
sent, he wrote:
[The decision] ... tends to emphasize that the basic opposing forces in
industry are not management and labor but the operating group on
the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group on the other.
The industrial problem as so defined comes down to a contest over a
fair division of the gross receipts of industry between these two
groups. The struggle for control or power between management and
labor becomes secondary to a growing unity in their common de-
mands on ownership.
... [If foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act so are vice-presidents, managers, assistant
managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents - indeed, all
who are on the payroll of the company, including the president; all
who are commonly referred to as the management, with the
exception of the directors. ... [O]nce vice-presidents, managers, su-
perintendents, foremen all are unionized, management and labor will
become more of a solid phalanx than separate factions in warring
camps. Indeed, the thought of some labor leaders that if those in the
hierarchy above the workers are unionized, they will be more sympa-
88. Id- at 489-90. The Court gave this example:
Though the foreman is the faithful representative of the employer in
maintaining a production schedule, his interest properly may be ad-
verse to that of the employer when it comes to fixing his own wages,
hours, seniority rights or working conditions. He does not lose his
right to serve himself in these respects because he serves his master
in others.
Id. This argument, said the Court, was predicated on the erroneous notion
that "because the employer has the right to wholehearted loyalty in the per-
formance of the contract of employment, the employee does not have the right
to protect his independent and adverse interest in the terms of the contract
itself and the conditions of work." Id- at 490.
89. Id- at 493.
90. Id at 493 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91. Justice Douglas asserted that the majority's decision was a step in the
direction Justice Brandeis had foreshadowed more than 30 years previously.
330 U.S. at 494. Justice Brandeis had urged, Justice Douglas argued, narrowing
the gap between management and labor, and the development of an industrial
system emphasizing cooperation and affording labor participation in policy de-
cisions. Id. at 493.
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thetic with the claims of those below them, is a manifestation of the
same idea.
92
In short, Justice Douglas was concerned that allowing su-
pervisors to organize would confer too much power on labor.
Worse, permitting supervisor organization would begin a slide
down a slippery slope with few discernable stopping places, as
the courts would be pushed, by the force of logic, to continue to
augment labor's power. This theme, articulated best by Justice
Douglas, was later to become a familiar refrain in the Court's
decisions concerning the Act's definition of "employee."
B. THE EXCLUSION OF SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES
In 1947, Congress heeded Justice Douglas's words and
passed the Taft-Hartley Act, which statutorily excluded super-
visory employees from the NLRA's definition of "employee". 93
The Taft-Hartley Act modified section 2(3) of the Wagner Act
to provide that "[t]he term 'employee' ... shall not include...
any individual employed as a supervisor."94 Section 2(11) was
added, defining the term "supervisor":
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or re-
sponsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the ex-
ercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment.9 5
During the debates on Taft-Hartley, the legislators focused on
management's need for faithful agents.96 Congress was clearly
92. Id. at 494-95 (footnote omitted).
93. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 137-38 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1988), re-
printed in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA.
TIONS ACT, 1947, at 1-30 (1948)) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. Congress
relied heavily on Justice Douglas' dissent in Packard in enacting Taft-Hartley.
See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra, at 305-08; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 409-11.
94. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
95. NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)(1988).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY supra note 93, at 307. The House Report on Taft-Hart-
ley, for example, contains the following statement:
[J]ust as there are people on labor's side to say what workers want
and have a right to expect, there must be in management and loyal to
it persons not subject to influence or control of unions, not only to as-
sign people to their work, to see that they keep at their work and do
it well, to correct them when they are at fault, and to settle their
complaints and grievances, but to determine how much work employ-
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proceeding on the assumption that hierarchical workplace or-
ganization, with capital "bossing" supervisors and supervisors
"bossing" the rank and file, was best. Congress was concerned
that foremen's unions, even when nominally separate from
rank-and-file unions, would be vulnerable to influence by the
rank and file union.9 Such vulnerability to influence by rank
and file workers, Congress believed, would undermine the
workplace hierarchy.98
In addition, the legislators articulated a concern that al-
lowing supervisors to unionize would threaten capitalistic val-
ues that honored individualism and fostered competition
between workers.9 Supervisors, who presumably had risen to
their station in life by virtue of individual merit, neither
needed the protection of unions, nor wanted them.1' ° Congress
did not want to subject supervisors, who had demonstrated ini-
tiative, ambition, and ability to get ahead, to the levelling
processes of seniority, uniformity, and standardization. 10 1 Con-
gress believed that these "fundamental principles of unionism"
would tend to discourage individual achievement and ulti-
mately would impair the country's productivity.10 2
The current state of the law, then, is that supervisor union-
ization is not protected by law. This does not mean that unioni-
zation by supervisors is illegal. Section 14(a) of the Act
explicitly protects the right of supervisors to organize collec-
ees should do, what pay they should receive for it, and to carry on the
whole of labor relations.
97. Id at 14, reprinted in LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 93, at 305.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. The House Report statech "No one forced [supervisors] to become su-
pervisors. They abandoned the 'collective security' of the rank and file volun-
tarily, because they believed the opportunities thus opened to them to be more
valuable to them than such 'security'." Id at 16-17, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 93, at 307-08.
101. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17, reprinted in LEGIS-
LATivE HISTORY, supra note 93, at 307-08.
102. See id. The Report does not explain how the Wagner Act "subjected"
foremen to the principles of unionism. The Report should have, because
unionization was, of course, at their option. Virginia Seitz describes Congress'
view of supervisors as "distorted." Seitz, supra note 8, at 240. Congress, ar-
gues Seitz, ignored the phenomena of twentieth century foremanship - in-
cluding falling wages relative to unionized employees, arbitrary discharge, loss
of authority and prestige - that were discussed widely in the major business
periodicals. See id. at 240-41. Seitz concludes that "Congress attempted to leg-
islate its conception of ideal supervisors into existence." Id. at 241.
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tively.'03 They may not, however, claim protection under the
Act for organizing activities, nor may they require the em-
ployer to recognize and bargain with their unions once
formed.10 4 Thus, the "new" industrial division between capital
and supervisors that Congress, employers, and Justice Douglas
had feared was avoided. Foremen were "back on the team"
with capital.10 5
C. THE ExCLusION OF MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
Prior to passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,' °6 the National
Labor Relations Board had excluded employees from rank-and-
file bargaining units if they were "closely related to manage-
ment,"'01 7 or when their authority "stamp[ed] them as manage-
103. NLRA § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1988). Section 14(a) was added at
the same time supervisors were excluded from coverage. Section 14(a)
preempts state statutes that attempt to protect supervisors who seek to union-
ize against employer retaliation (usually in the form of discharge). See Beas-
ley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 662 (1974) (holding state
law affording remedy to supervisors preempted and thus, employer retains
self-help weapon of discharge).
104. See Klare, The Bitter and the Sweet. Reflections on the Supreme
Court's Yeshiva Decision, 1983 SOCIALIST REV. 99, 106 n.* (1983) (describing
limitations on rights of non-covered employees under the NLRA) [hereinafter,
The Bitter and the Sweet]. Indeed, a union's efforts to pressure an employer to
maintain pension benefits for its supervisor-members may furnish the basis for
RICO charges against the union. See Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry Co.
v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 722 F. Supp.
1472, 1474 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
Furthermore, supervisors enjoy an increasingly limited "derivative" pro-
tection under the Act. In Automobile Salesmen's Union Local 1095 v. NLRB
(Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc.), 711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the D.C. Circuit
upheld the Board's ruling that an employer may discharge a supervisor who
complains about discharges of rank-and-file employees covered by the NLRA.
M at 385. In Parker-Robb, the Board overruled 15 years of precedent holding
that discipline of supervisors designed to instill fear in rank-and-file employ-
ees that their own protected organized activities would subject them to a simi-
lar fate violated the NLRA. See id. at 385. The D.C. Circuit approved the
Board's new balance that favored the employer's right to demand loyalty from
supervisors over the employee's right to be free from unfair labor practices
that the employer funnels through a supervisor. Id at 386-88. The discharge
of a supervisor is now unlawful only if it directly interferes with the Section 7
rights of statutorily protected employees. Id. at 387.
105. Seitz characterizes the Taft-Hartley Act as an attempt by employers -
which ultimately proved successful - to regain control over the loyalty of low-
level supervisors, a necessary first step in the "salvage operation of managerial
prerogatives which had appeared to slip away during the war." Seitz, supra
note 8, at 243.
106. See supra note 93.
107. See Friez & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943)(excluding expediters, who
are charged with the duty of expediting the completion of orders and ensuring
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rial."'105  The Board's policy regarding the exclusion of
managerial employees from rank-and-file bargaining units was
best stated in Ford Motor Company.1 9 There, the Board char-
acterized as managerial all employees "who are in a position to
formulate, determine and effectuate management policies ...
[because] they express and make operative the decisions of
management.""10
Although the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments referred ex-
plicitly only to supervisors, the NLRB expanded its practice of
excluding managerial employees from rank-and-file bargaining
units. The Board ruled that managerial employees were not
covered under the Act for any purpose."' The Board reasoned
that Taft-Hartley's statutory exclusion of supervisors indicated
that Congress had intended to exclude employees who exer-
cised a significant degree of authority over the rank and file."-m
In 1970, the NLRB departed from its previous position that
the NLRA did not cover managers. In North Arkansas Electric
Cooperative, Inc.,113 the Board established a presumption that
the Act entitled managerial employees to bargaining rights un-
less it could be shown that they were involved in shaping or im-
plementing labor relations policies for their employers."14 In
ALRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,"15 the Supreme Court refused to
accept the Board's new rule as an accurate reflection of Con-
gressional intent, and reinstated the Board's former rule."16
The Bell Aerospace Court began by noting that neither the
language of the Taft-Hartley Act nor its legislative history ad-
adherence to production time schedules, from a proposed unit of production
and maintenance workers).
108. See Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 N.L.RB. 1491, 1498 (1944) (excluding expe-
diters, who contact vendors, place orders, keep records of their progress or de-
liveries, and have authority to reassign orders, from a unit containing office,
technical, clerical, and professional employees; expediters' authority to exer-
cise their discretion in making commitments on behalf of the company
"stamps them as managerial").
109. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
110. Id. at 1322.
111. See Denver Dry Goods Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1175 (1947) (excluding
assistant buyers because their interests were "closely identified with those of
management"); accord Denton's, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35, 37 (1949); see also Swift
& Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 (1956)(finding that individuals allied with or
acting as representatives of management are not employees under the Act).
112. See Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4
(1947).
113. 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970).
114. Id. at 550-51.
115. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
116. Id- at 289.
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dressed the status of managerial employees." 7 The Court rea-
soned that because managerial employees were higher in the
authority structure than supervisors, they were "regarded as so
clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision
was thought necessary."" 8 The Court concluded that "the in-
ference is plain that 'managerial employees' were paramount
among this impliedly excluded group."" 9
Justice White, writing for three other members of the
Court, dissented.1 0 He argued that the specific exemption of
supervisory employees from the Act's coverage, particularly
given the Act's explicit inclusion of professional employees in
section 2(12), indicated that Congress had intended to exclude
only supervisors.' 2 1 Furthermore, he pointed out, the Board
had never held managerial employees to be outside the scope of
the Wagner Act prior to Taft-Hartley.-2 In fact, the Board had
two distinct categories of decisions regarding the Act's coverage
of managerial employees, which the majority opinion had effec-
tively collapsed into one. In the first category were decisions
refusing to include managerial employees within bargaining
units of rank and file employees on the traditional ground of a
lack of community of interest, and in the second were decisions
concerning the rights of managerial employees to organize into
discrete bargaining units.23 Justice White concluded that Con-
gress's silence, particularly in light of Board practice treating
supervisory and managerial employees differently, suggested
that Congress had not intended to exclude managerial employ-
ees from the protections of the Act.124
At the core of the divergence of opinion on the Court was
the basic question originally raised in Justice Douglas' dissent
in Packard Motor Car.125 The majority in Bell Aerospace was
concerned with the "fundamental change in industrial philoso-
phy" that the inclusion of managerial employees within the
Act's coverage would accomplish.126 Surely, the majority rea-
117. See id. at 279-83.
118. Id- at 283.
119. Id- at 284.
120. 416 U.S. at 295 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Stewart, and
Marshall joined in the dissent.
121. Id at 297-99.
122. Id at 299-300.
123. I-
124. 416 U.S. at 302-03 (White, J., dissenting).
125. 330 U.S. 485, 493-95 (1947). See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying
text.
126. 416 U.S. at 284 (quotation omitted). The Bell Aerospace majority reit-
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soned, Congress would not have attempted to obliterate the
traditional distinction between labor and management in such
an indirect fashion. 2' The dissent's position was simply that
the majority's interpretation was overinclusive because it would
reach "not only vertically, but laterally, to deny 'hundreds of
thousands' of... relatively low-level management employees
the . .. protections of the Act."' ' s Thus, the dissent did not
take issue with the basic proposition that traditional lines
should continue to exist between management and labor.
Rather, the dissent argued the line should be drawn in a differ-
ent place.
In 1980, the Supreme Court revisited the parameters of the
managerial class of employees in NtRB v. Yeshiva Univer-
sity. 2 9 In Yeshiva, the Court dealt with the tension between
the National Labor Relations Act's implied exclusion of mana-
gerial employees and its explicit inclusion of professionals. The
Board argued that the managerial exclusion could not be ap-
plied in a straightforward fashion to exclude university faculty,
because as professional employees they often appear to be exer-
cising managerial authority when they are merely performing
erated the view expressed by Justice Douglas in his Packard dissent: "[The
Wagner Act was designed to protect 'laborers' and 'workers,' not vice presi-
dents and others clearly within the managerial hierarchy. Extension of the
Act to cover true 'managerial employees' would indeed be revolutionary, for it
would eviscerate the traditional distinction between labor and management."
Id. at 285 n.13.
127. Id. at 284 n.13 and 289 n.18. The majority, again echoing Justice Doug-
las' "slippery slope" argument in Packard, speculated about the "far-reaching
results" of the dissent's view:
Although a shop foreman would be excluded from the Act, a wide
range of executives would be included. A major company, for exam-
ple, may have scores of executive officers who formulate and effectu-
ate management policies, yet have no supervisory responsibility or
identifiable conflict of interest in labor relations. If Congress in-
tended the unionization of such executives, it most certainly would
have made its design plain.
I& at 289 n.18. Justice White responded to this argument:
The majority expresses concern that extending organizational and
bargaining rights to managerial employees would permit the exten-
sion of the Act to vice presidents and other high level executives,
thereby blurring the distinction between management and labor. The
concern is overblown; for most, if not all, executives will obviously be
"super" supervisors, confidential employees, professionals or within
the Board's definition of those employees whose organization would
result in a conflict of interest with respect to the company's labor
policies.
Id. at 307 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 307 n.3 (citation omitted).
129. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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routine job duties.'1s The Board contended that faculty, as in-
dependent professionals who are rewarded for pursuing profes-
sional values, present no problem of divided loyalty despite
their substantial role in academic governance. 131
The Court rejected the Board's argument, ruling that
faculty members who possess absolute authority in academic
matters are managerial employees outside the protection of the
Act. 3 2 Although acknowledging the tension between the Act's
inclusion of professionals and the judiciary's exclusion of mana-
gerial employees, the Court nevertheless refused to sanction
the Board's inquiry into whether the decisions made were exer-
cises of professional judgment rather than exercises of manage-
rial power.'3s Instead, the Court found that, precisely because
faculty do possess a large measure of professional indepen-
dence, the university's reliance on its faculty to shape and im-
plement its policies created an acute danger of divided
loyalty.' 34 The Court proceeded on the assumption that "[t]he
Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-em-
ployee relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of pri-
vate industry,"'' 1 and analogized the university to private
industry.1'
Justice Brennan, joined by three other members of the
Court, dissented.L3 7 He argued that the majority had blindly
applied to academic institutions principles developed in the con-
text of the authority structure of the industrial setting. 3 8 Jus-
tice Brennan pointed out that the bureaucratic foundation of
most "mature" universities is characterized by dual authority
systems: a hierarchical administrative network, and a parallel
professional network, created to bring the expertise of the
faculty into the decision-making process. 3 9 Faculty members,
whose involvement in university decision-making occurs only
through the second system, offer recommendations based on
expertise as professional educators, not because of any manage-
130. Id. at 683-84.
131. IM at 684.
132. See id. at 686.
133. Id. at 686-87.
134. 444 U.S. at 689-90.
135. Id- at 680.
136. Id. at 680-81.
137. Id. at 691 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined in the dissent.
138. See id at 694.
139. 444 U.S. at 696-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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rial or supervisory prerogative. 40 Because faculty do not serve
as the representatives of management, they do not fit within
the category of employees traditionally excluded by the Board
as managerial.' 41 There is, argued Justice Brennan, no danger
of divided loyalty.14
The Board took the final step shortly thereafter in College
of Osteopathic Medicine and Surgery (COMS),143 ruling that a
faculty that had gained its authority to influence institutional
policy solely through collective bargaining was managerial, and
therefore outside the protection of the Act.'" To the union's
argument that employees should not be able to "bargain [them-
selves] out of the protections of the Act,'145 the Board re-
sponded that neither the Yeshiva decision nor the Act itself
distinguished between situations in which managerial authority
was present originally and circumstances in which such author-
ity was gained through employer concessions at the collective
bargaining table.'" Consequently, the Board revoked the
union's certification.147
In effect, then, COMS stands for the proposition that once
employees achieve, through collective bargaining, the real abil-
ity to participate fully with the employer in decision-making,
they lose the Act's protection.14 As one judge put it in a post-
COMS case: "If managerial employees are powerful enough to
'effectively control' policy, then they are the employer. Conse-
quently they can no more divide loyalties between the em-
140. Id at 697.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 698-99. Justice Brennan argued that employers judge faculty
members on the quality of their teaching and scholarship, not on whether they
agree with administration policy. Id. at 699-700. The latter notion, he argued,
would be antithetical to the concept of academic freedom. Id. at 700.
143. 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982).
144. Id. at 298.
145. Id. at 297. The union was concerned that if the faculty were unpro-
tected by a collective bargaining agreement, the university unilaterally could,
and would, strip the faculty of whatever managerial authority it had achieved
through collective bargaining. Id.
146. Id. at 297-98.
147. Id at 298.
148. Scholars have roundly criticized the Yeshiva decision and its ultimate
progeny COMS. See, e.g., Angel, Professionals and Unionization, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 383, 388 (1982); Bixler, Industrial Democracy and the Managerial Em-
ployee Exception to the NLRA, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 442 (1985); The Bitter
and the Sweet, supra note 104; Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers
from Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89 COLUm. L. REV. 1775, 1779




ployer and the union than they could between themselves and
the union."'149
D. THE EXCLUSION OF CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES
Another group of employees not specifically excluded by
the Act is confidential employees.150 The Board initially re-
jected the notion that the Wagner Act contained any implied
exclusion of employees who had access to confidential informa-
tion of their employers. 151 As it had done with managerial em-
ployees, however, the Board excluded confidential employees
from rank-and-file bargaining units, at least when they had ac-
cess to confidential labor relations information of the em-
ployer. 152  Subsequently the Board decided to exclude
confidential employees with access to labor relations informa-
tion from bargaining units composed solely of confidential em-
ployees.153 The Board reasoned that it was unfair to require an
employer to bargain and deal with a union that would possess
inside information about the company's positions on labor mat-
ters because its members were employed in confidential posi-
149. NLRB v. Lewis Univ., 765 F.2d 616, 632 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
150. A "confidential employee" is one who may have access to information
the employer considers confidential. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural
Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 171-72 (1981).
151. See Bull Dog Elec. Prods. Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1046 (1940). The com-
pany sought to exclude from the bargaining unit employees of the engineering
department by arguing that "they are entrusted with confidential matters; and
as they act in the interest of the management and exercise considerable discre-
tion and judgment in their work, they are not 'employees' within the meaning
of the Act." I& The Board rejected the company's argument and held that
there is "no warrant under the Act to deprive these employees of the benefits
accruing from their right to self-organization." I&; see also Creamery Package
Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108, 110-11 (1941) (noting that the company argued that
employees who have access to material, production, labor costs and payroll
records are confidential employees and should be excluded from the bargain-
ing unit). In Creamery Package the Board held that "possession of important
information [which does not relate directly to the problem of labor relations]
is of itself insufficient to justify exclusion from the right to collective bargain-
ing." 34 N.L.R.B. at 111.
152. Creamery Package, 34 N.L.R.B. at 110 (excluding a stenographer from
the rank-and-file bargaining unit because the stenographer's work involved
dictating reports that related to labor problems in the company); Brooklyn
Daily Eagle, 13 N.L.R.B. 974, 986 (1939) (excluding personal secretaries from
the rank-and-file bargaining unit based on the confidential nature of their
work and their access to information bearing on labor negotiations and labor
grievances).




tions.15 4 This became known as the Board's "labor-nexus" test.
Under the test, confidential employees were those who in the
"normal performance of their duties may obtain advance infor-
mation of the [c]ompany's position with regard to contract ne-
gotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations
matters." 5 5
The Board modified its position in 1946 in Ford Motor
Co.,'5 6 limiting the term "confidential" to include only those
employees who assist or act in a confidential relation to persons
exercising managerial functions in the field of labor rela-
tions.157 Although Taft-Hartley made no explicit reference to
confidential employees, the Supreme Court's decision in Bell
Aerospace'58 cast doubt on the protected status of confidential
employees who did not fit within the Board's narrow definition
of excluded confidential employees. 5 9 Dictum in Bell Aero-
space suggested that Congress, in enacting the Taft-Hartley
Act, believed that all employees with access to confidential in-
formation of their employers had been excluded from the Wag-
ner Act by prior NLRB decisions, and that Congress intended
to freeze into law that interpretation of the Wagner Act.160
In NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
Corp.,1 1 a divided Supreme Court approved the Board's "labor-
nexus" test as set out in Ford Motor Co., stating that the dictum
in Bell Aerospace was "in error."'1 62 The Court concluded that
the labor-nexus test was "rooted firmly in the Board's under-
standing of the nature of the collective-bargaining process," and
that Congress had accepted the Board's practice of excluding
from bargaining units only those confidential employees satisfy-
ing the labor nexus test.16 In one of the two consolidated cases
before it, the Court approved the Board's order reinstating a
personal secretary to the general manager and chief executive
officer of the employer, who had been discharged for engaging
154. Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. at 1323.
155. Idc at 1323.
156. 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
157. Id. at 1322.
158. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
159. See Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946); supra text accompa-
nying note 156.
160. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454
U.S. 170, 186-87 (1981) (quoting Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 283 n.12).
161. 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
162. Id. at 187-90.
163. Id- at 190.
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in concerted activity protected by section 8(a)(1) of the Act.16
In the other case,' the Court approved the Board's finding that
none of the employees included in a unit for certification were
confidential employees under the labor-nexus test.ls5
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion repeated the familiar
refrain that inclusion of confidential employees with no in-
volvement in labor relations matters is erroneous because it
"'tends to obliterate the line between management and la-
bor."'166 Likening confidential employees to supervisory and
managerial employees because they tend to be aligned with
management by virtue of "their duties, knowledge, or sympa-
thy," Justice Powell argued that confidential employees should
not be permitted to join rank-and-file unions or take advantage
of the Act's protections.167 Justice Powell believed it unfair to
force on either management or labor a potentially disloyal
"fifth column." 16
III. CRITIQUE OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
RESTRICTING NLRA COVERAGE TO THE
RANK AND FILE
As the discussion above demonstrates, supervisory, mana-
gerial, and confidential employees with a labor nexus have
been denied NLRA protection for reasons that fall essentially
into one of four categories: 1) the characterization of these
workers as "employees" protected by the Act would blur the
traditional lines between management and labor, thereby un-
dermining the hierarchical structure of the workplace upon
which our labor laws are premised;169 2) supervisors, managers,
and confidential employees owe a duty of loyalty to capital, and
in effect act as its representatives; hence, they face a conflict of
164. Id at 172-73, 190-91. Hendricks had discharged Mary Weatherman for
signing a petition seeking reinstatement of a fellow employee who was dis-
missed after losing his arm in the course of his employment. Id- at 172. The
Board's finding that Weatherman did not aiaist in a confidential capacity with
respect to labor relations policies was not challenged. Id. at 191. Although
Weatherman shared a partitioned office with the general manager, there was
no evidence that Weatherman's duties concerned confidential matters of any
description. Id. at 174 n.5; id. at 192 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
165. 454 U.S. at 175, 191.
166. Id. at 192 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Burger,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined Justice Powell's dissent.
167. Id. at 193-95.
168. Id. at 193.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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interest when required to discipline fellow union members;170
3) supervisors and managers should not be subjected to the lev-
elling processes of unionization because this flies in the face of
capitalistic values;171 and 4) supervisors and managers are suffi-
ciently powerful that they do not need protection.172 I turn
now to a critique of these justifications.
A. THE BLURRING OF TRADITIONAL LINES BETWEEN
MANAGEMENT AND LABOR
Perhaps the most basic objection to the inclusion of super-
visors, managers and confidential employees within the Act's
coverage is the argument, first raised by Justice Douglas in
Packard, that lending the sanction of federal law to unioniza-
tion by these employees "tends to obliterate the line between
management and labor.' '173 The majority opinion in Bell Aero-
space reiterated this concern about the "fundamental change in
industrial philosophy" that would be wrought by inclusion of
managerial employees within the Act's coverage. 74 The dissent
in Hendricks County echoed the same theme, urging that even
confidential employees with no involvement in labor relations
matters should be excluded from the Act's protections.175
This argument is troubling for two reasons. The assump-
tion that our labor laws are necessarily founded on a hierarchi-
cal model of workplace organization operates to ensure that the
workplace continues to be organized that way. Continuation of
the hierarchical model makes true adversarial collective bar-
gaining impossible. "Labor" as defined under the current struc-
ture of our labor laws is not sufficiently powerful to pose a
meaningful threat to employer control. 7 6 Moreover, attempts
to create cooperative workplace structures only serve to further
170. See supra notes 88, 96 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
173. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
174. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 284 n.13 (1974).
175. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S.
170, 194-95 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
176. See Atleson, supra note 9, at 841-42 (contending that judicial rhetoric
reflects an assumption that labor has evolved into a "substantial equalizer" to
capital; arguing that such rhetoric "is painfully ironic today and has always
been mythical"); Stone, supra note 5, at 164 (stating that workers and employ-
ees are not truly "partners in production" because management retains discre-
tion to establish most conditions of employment, including job tenure and
compensation, unless it explicitly bargains away these rights).
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co-opt workers, who are too powerless to "cooperate" in any
meaningful sense.177
The second reason that this argument is troubling is that
ideal forms of workplace democracy entail cooperation between
capital and labor. 78 Because cooperation is a synonym for co-
optation in a system in which labor does not possess equal
power with capital, the Court's paradigm of the labor laws pre-
cludes achievement of industrial democracy.179 Worse, the situ-
ation is likely to deteriorate. The presently unfolding
implications of workplace reorganization foreshadow the possi-
bility that more and more workplaces, including those in indus-
try, will begin to look the way the Supreme Court believed
Yeshiva University was organized. 180 As a consequence of the
Court's Yeshiva decision, therefore, a growing segment of
workers will be unable to unionize, and instead will be co-opted
through worker participation/cooperation programs.' 8 '
177. Although many have embraced labor-management cooperative pro-
grams because of the appeal that they hold for liberals with idealistic visions
of the workplace, many more have attacked them as a new form of co-optation
- one of the "last tricks of capitalism." See Stone, supra note 5, at 168-69; see
also id at 170-71 (positing that for worker participation through cooperative
programs to be other than a false promise, power must be redistributed to the
benefit of workers, and until that occurs, the cooperative vision of the work-
place is heuristic at best).
178. See Bixler, supra note 148, at 441-42; The Labor-Management Coopera-
tion Debate, supra note 5, at 50-51. Klare notes that if democratic values are to
be served, adversarial collective bargaining must coexist with labor-manage-
ment cooperation. Id. Klare concludes that "[h]ealthy, productive cooperation
requires the existence of autonomous, collective organization of workers, a
central feature of adversarialism." i at 60.
179. Bixler, supra note 148, at 450.
180. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text; The Bitter and the
Sweet, supra note 104, at 120-21. The change in the technostructure to a ser-
vice-oriented economic system will further underscore the significance of de-
ciding where the line between capital and labor should be drawn. John
Kenneth Galbraith has described the existence of a visible line between own-
ers and employees in the entrepreneurial corporation. J. GALBRArTH, supra
note 33, at 268. In the mature corporation, however, the line tends to disap-
pear as the location of decision moves in the direction of the body of white-
collar workers. Thus, distinguishing between those who make decisions and
those who carry them out - that is, between employer and employee - be-
comes almost impossible. ML
181. The Court assumed in Yeshiva (ultimately carried to its extreme in
COMS) that once employees have attained a voice in workplace decisions, they
are on an equal footing with management and can dispense with the protec-
tion of labor laws. That assumption is seriously flawed. The interests of labor
and management are never identical, and individual employees will need the
representation of the union when they are forced into a conflict with the rest
of the collective or are championing a minority position. See Bixler, supra note
148, at 466. As former Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall observed: "[A]s long
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Several writers have suggested that the idea that our labor
laws depend on maintaining a distinction between management
and labor is predicated on Tayloristic notions of workplace or-
ganization, which were themselves developed to ensure the
continuation of a hierarchical workplace structure with capital
at the top. 8 2 "Taylorism" or "scientific management" refers to
a workplace organization approach that achieved popularity
during the first half of the twentieth century. 8 3 Frederick
Winslow Taylor and his followers advocated the application of
"scientific" methods to the problem of controlling labor.'84
The core tenets of Taylorism are: 1) management assumes the
task of gathering all of the traditional knowledge possessed by
workers, and then of classifying, tabulating, and reducing the
knowledge to rules; 8 5 2) all possible "brain-work" is removed
from the shop and centered in the planning department, so as
to wrest control of the labor process from the worker and to
cheapen labor; 8 6 3) management plans out the work of every
employee, specifying each day what tasks are to be done, the
way in which they should be done, and the time allotted for
completing them. 8 7
as there are workers in a democratic market setting, there will be a need for
organizations to represent their interests. Trying to have industrial or eco-
nomic democracy without unions would be like trying to have political democ-
racy without political parties." Marshall, The American Industrial Relations
System in a Time of Change, 48 U. PrIT. L. REV. 829, 837-38 (1987).
182. See, e.g., The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 114; Stone, supra
note 5, at 143-44.
183. The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate, supra note 5, at 57.
184. As Harry Braverman points out in his oft-cited and thorough explica-
tion of the principles of Taylorism, "scientific management" is far from scien-
tific; it enters the workplace as the representative of management,
masquerading in the trappings of science. H. BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOP-
OLY CAPrrAL 86 (1974).
185. Id at 112. Braverman refers to this principle as the "dissociation of
the labor process from the skills of the workers." Id. at 113. The idea was to
break the hold that skilled workers possessed over the production process. See
Stone, supra note 5, at 141.
186. H. BRAVERMAN, supra note 184, at 113. This is the heart of Taylorism;
Braverman calls it the principle of the "separation of conception from execu-
tion." Id. at 114. The effect of this tactic is to dehumanize the labor process, to
reduce workers almost to the level of labor in its animal form. Id. at 113.
Breaking the unity of the labor process and separating execution from concep-
tion is crucial if management is to enforce on workers the methodological effi-
ciency and working pace desired. Id. at 113-14. A basic premise of this
principle is that the systematic study of work and the fruits of this study are a
management prerogative; workers thus lose control over their own labor and
the manner of its performance. Id. at 116.
187. Id. at 118. Braverman calls this the "use of [management's] monopoly
over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of exe-
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Taylor's scientific management movement was designed to
abolish the power workers exercised over the direction of the
production process during the nineteenth century.1 8s The
source of workers' power lay in their superior knowledge about
the production process.8 9 Taylorism was characterized by fear
of that power.19° Taylorism thus originally represented a sys-
tematic effort to undermine union strength by depriving work-
ers of the knowledge that lies at the root of their power.191
Over the years, Taylorism has become so embedded in our
concept of the employment relationship that its application to-
day is almost unconscious. The continuing influence of Taylor-
ism in the law is evidenced by the NLRA's definition of
"supervisor." The NLRA's definition refers to the use of "in-
dependent judgment" by supervisors, 192 reflecting the Tayloris-
tic view that the execution of work should be separated from
its conception. Thus, "employees" covered by the NLRA pro-
vide the "brawn", while supervisors provide the '"rains" and
are aligned with capital. The Board's determinations regarding
who is a "supervisor" within the meaning of section 2(11) pro-
vide further evidence of this Tayloristic influence, as well as
demonstrating the arbitrariness of drawing lines in this
fashion.193
cution." I&i at 119. This tenet of Taylorism gave birth to time and motion
studies, and to the establishment of different piece rate systems, which gave
faster workers an incentive to out-perform others. Stone, supra note 5, at 141.
See generally J. ATLESON, supra note 52, at 103-04 (discussing Taylorism); H.
BRAvERmAN, supra note 184, at 85-123 (same); The Labor-Management Cooper-
ation Debate, supra note 5, at 57 n.49 (same); Stone, supra note 5, at 140-44
(same).
188. See D. MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA 9 (1979).
189. I&
190. As Taylor himself wrote, "[Traditional knowledge may be said to be
the principle [sic] asset or possession of every tradesman ... [The] foremen
and superintendents know, better than anyone else, that their own knowledge
and personal skill falls far short of the combined knowledge and dexterity of
all the workmen under them." F. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT 31-32 (1967). William Haywood aptly summarized the reason
for ownership's fear when he wrote, "The manager's brains are under the
workman's cap." W. HAYWOOD & F. BOHN, INDUSTRIAL SOCIALISM 27 (1911).
191. Cf D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 188, at 27 (discussing how advocates
of scientific management sought to discredit industrial practices that placed re-
sponsibility in employees' hands).
192. NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988); see supra text accompanying
note 94.
193. See, e.g., Detroit College of Business, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1081, 1083
(1989) (rejecting "shorthand" approach that an individual who supervises non-
bargaining unit employees less than 50% of his time is not a supervisor, in
favor of making "a complete examination of all the factors present to deter-
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Similarly, the Court's treatment of "supervisors" as aligned
with ownership is grounded in Taylorism. In his dissent in
Packard, Justice Douglas wrote: "I find no evidence that one
personnel group may be both employers and employees within
the meaning of the Act,"'194 and "[tirade union history shows
that foremen were the arms and legs of management in execut-
ing labor policies."1 95 Katherine Stone has examined the role
Taylorism has played in shaping the decisions of the Court and
the Board, and argues that the often perplexing insistence on
maintaining boundaries or "lines" between management and la-
bor can be traced to Tayloristic conceptions of the employment
relationship.196 Stone explains that the Tayloristic, or function-
alist approach assumes that such boundaries are essential to
production. 97 She concludes that such functionalism is "con-
structed and contingent, rather than natural and necessary"
and was in fact "an ideological construct [applied] with the ex-
plicit aim of reconstructing and recreating the industrial
world."19 8
There is evidence, moreover, that the adversarial nature of
American industrial relations, and in particular the hostility
many unions express for employers, is also the result of Taylor-
ism. Klare notes that the adversarial spirit of American indus-
trial relations was triggered by employers' application of
scientific management techniques in a deliberate effort to sap
mine the nature of the individual's alliance with management"). See generally
Annotation, Who Are Supervisors within Meaning of National Labor Rela-
tions Act in Service Operations, 49 A.L.R FED. 230, 230-310 (1980) (surveying
determinations of supervisory status in service industries).
194. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 495 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
195. I& at 496.
196. Stone, supra note 5, at 146.
197. I&
198. Id. Klare also has argued that labor law doctrines such as the manage-
rial exclusion articulated in Yeshiva are bottomed on scientific management
theories. See The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 115. Klare posits
that the Court's decisions reflect its belief that current industrial organization
does not rely on or encourage the workers' ability to disseminate, generate, or
apply new information about their work, nor exercise independent judgment
regarding the organization of their work or the direction of the enterprise;
such judgment is the responsibility - the sole prerogative - of management.
Id at 114-15. He points out that there is no "scientific" or technical reason
why the workplace must be organized around an assumption of employee
powerlessness and intellectual incapacity; nor has the Court examined the as-
sumption that hierarchy and control are essential preconditions of industrial
efficiency. Id. at 115.
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organized labor's strength.'9 Adversarialism persists today, he
argues, in part because Taylorism has become embedded in
American labor law.2°
It is time to uncouple functionalist, Tayloristic notions
from our labor laws. The Tayloristic approach taken by the
80th Congress in enacting Taft-Hartley, and by the Supreme
Court in its Bell Aerospace and Yeshiva decisions, has shaped
our present vision of the workplace.20 1 More fundamentally, it
has limited the "universe of possibilities in our imagination" for
workplace restructuring.2 0 2
B. CONFLICT OF INTEREST/DIVIDED LOYALTY
Another oft-repeated justification for the exclusion of su-
pervisors, managers, and confidential employees is the argu-
ment that, as adversaries under our labor laws, management
and workers have conflicting interests. If middle-level employ-
ees who represent the interests of the employer align with
workers, employees will face an insurmountable division of loy-
alties. Summarized in this way, the conflict of interest ration-
ale is tautological: because they are adversaries, management
and labor have conflicting interests, and because they have con-
flicting interests, they must remain adversaries.
Conflict of interest as a basis for excluding middle-level
employees from NLRA coverage has two separate aspects.
First, a conflict is said to exist between actions that would fur-
ther the interests of labor as a collective (i.e., the union) and
actions that further capital's interest.2 0 3 This alleged conflict of
interest can be traced to an "entity" view of the corporation
that envisions the corporation as a whole, separate from its con-
stituent parts.2 4 According to the entity conception of the cor-
poration, unions represent the narrow interest of labor, while
those in power, such as owners, managers,and board members,
199. The Labor-Management Cooperation Debate, supra note 5, at 65.
200. Id; accord Stone, supra note 5, at 147.
201. Stone sometimes refers to this as a "naturalist" approach. See Stone,
supra note 5, at 144 n.306. Her label refers to the idea that the status quo -
hierarchical workplace organization with the concomitant separation of func-
tions between management and labor - is "natural" and therefore inevitable.
See supra note 39.
202. Stone, supra note 5, at 144 n.306.
203. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. The Parker-Robb case is
a typical example of application of a conflict of interest rationale. Automobile
Salesmen's Local 1095 v. NLRB (Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc.) 711 F.2d 383
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see supra note 104.
204. See Stone, supra note 5, at 150.
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are charged with the duty of furthering the general interest of
the enterprise as a whole.205 In short, management owes a fi-
duciary duty to ownership, which is to bring together owner-
ship's capital and employees' labor to produce profit for the
benefit of ownership.2 °6 To discharge that duty, management
must remain separate from labor.2 r
This paradigm of the corporation itself reflects several as-
sumptions about the role of labor in corporate decision making.
It assumes that the corporation is a unified entity run by a
board of directors and a day-to-day management team devoted
to pursuing the owners' interests. In addition, decision-making
power in the corporation is understood as being linked to own-
ership. Finally, the paradigm reflects a belief that labor, a
mere supplier to the enterprise, has no role to play in corporate
decision-making.208 These views stem from a fear that organ-
ized labor will pursue interests antithetical to those of owner-
ship, and to society, if allowed to have a substantial voice in
policy-making for the enterprise.
Expressions of that fear appear in Packard Motor Car Co.
v. NLRB209 and in the debates on Taft-Hartley. The majority in
Packard characterized the company's argument as reflecting a
fear that foremen would be governed by interests of their fel-
low foremen rather than by the company's interest.210 Justice
Douglas worried that management and labor would combine
and assert demands on ownership, and that if allowed to union-
ize, management would be more sympathetic to the claims of
those below them.21 ' The House Report on Taft-Hartley ex-
pressed concern that unionized foremen would be "subject to
205. IL Ultimately, capital's interest is seen as synonymous with society's
interest - the promotion of commerce - while labor is charged with imped-
ing commerce and therefore ignoring the public's interest. This narrow con-
ception of interests is a powerful propaganda tool; the public is taught to think
of unions as selfish, greedy, and unconcerned with the impact which their ac-
tions have on the public.
206. Id at 151 (quoting NLRB v. Lewis Univ., 765 F.2d 616, 632 (7th Cir.
1985) (Swygert, J., dissenting)).
207. 111
208. 1& at 151. To illustrate the hold that these embedded notions of the
corporation have over our conception of workplace structure and labor's role
therein, Stone explores two intriguing alternative theories of the corporation
that leave room for a substantial labor voice. See iL at 152-61.
209. 330 U.S. 485 (1947); see suprm notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
210. IL at 490.
211. AL at 494-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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influence and control by the rank and file union."212
The fear that labor will represent only its narrow interests
if permitted a voice in policy decisions is reflected in many ar-
eas of labor law.213 That fear, and the paradigm of the work-
place that it spawns, pose significant barriers to the
achievement of workplace democracy. Because labor cannot be
trusted to consider the good of the enterprise or the good of so-
ciety, capital requires a cushioning layer of loyal representa-
tives - middle-level employees - to keep labor in its place.
If labor were entrusted with a significant role in corporate
decision-making, such a front-line "guard" would not be neces-
sary. As one writer points out, the concept of "shared author-
ity" characteristic of a truly democratized workplace would
entitle employees to an equal voice in decision-making.2 14 Af-
fording all workers an equal collective voice in decision-making
would render irrelevant the inquiry whether some employees
are "managerial instruments" of the employer, whose job it is
to keep the rank-and-file in line.2 1 5
A second and separate aspect of the conflict of interest ra-
tionale is the personal conflict that managers supposedly expe-
rience between serving ownership and serving themselves.
This "conflict" has its roots in the master-servant conception of
the employment relationship, in which the servant owes an ab-
solute duty of loyalty to the master.21 6 This conception of the
work relationship ignores the reality that people ordinarily do
their work (serve their masters) and retain their loyalty to
themselves. Worse, the master-servant paradigm, because it
conceives of the worker as uninterested in her own work and
how it fits together with the output of the enterprise,21 7 ignores
the worker's dignity and sentences her to alienation.2 1 8
212. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 93, at 292, 305.
213. See, e.g., Crain, supra note 78, at 1339-40 (arguing that the law reflects
assumption that unions, if permitted a voice on the issue of establishing em-
ployee drug detection programs, would oppose such programs; assumption is
unfounded as voluntarily developed Operation Red Block programs
demonstrate).
214. Bixler, supra note 148, at 466.
215. Id at 465-66.
216. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
217. Here another vestige of Taylorism rears its ugly head. Taylorism, be-
cause it limits the worker to execution and separates the worker from concep-
tion, leaves no room for the possibility that a worker might take pride in the
ultimate product of her labor.
218. Clearly, self-realization is impossible if the worker is not even consid-
ered to be master of her own work and time. As Kare puts it, "[o]ur labor law
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This second aspect of the "conflict of interest" rationale is
not, of course, unique to managers. However, it comes into
sharper focus because of the overlap between the professional
and managerial aspects of the jobs that many middle-level em-
ployees fill. In addition to their personal interests, many man-
agers have professional interests to serve. The injection of this
independent interest into the workplace severely threatens the
undivided loyalty that a servant owes to her master. For exam-
ple, a manager's professional code of ethics may conflict with
the requirements of her employer.2 19 A manager who is union-
ized will likely possess job security under her collective bar-
gaining agreement. Consequently, ownership is forced to
accommodate that independent interest in the running of the
enterprise. By contrast, a non-unionized, at-will manager faced
with the choice between unethical conduct and discharge will
tend to be coerced by economic exigency into loyalty to her
master.
220
This second aspect of the conflict of interest rationale for
the exclusion of middle-level employees from NLRA coverage
is perhaps the most telling of all the explanations advanced to
support the exclusion. It paints a bleak picture of managers as
subservient ciphers of management who are not even deemed
to have their own interests regarding the purpose or direction
is founded on the assumption that employee status and self-determination in
work are incompatible." The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 111 (em-
phasis omitted).
219. The Court refused to recognize this problem in Yeshiva. In that case,
the Court asserted that the faculty's professional interests could not be sepa-
rated from those of the institution. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 688
(1980). The Court's opinion on this point is, however, hopelessly contradictory.
The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 119. As Klare points out, the
Court simultaneously asserts that faculty have no professional interests dis-
tinct from those of the institution, and that the "independence" of faculty cre-
ates an "acute" danger of divided loyalty. Id (quoting Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 689-
90).
220. Manager/professionals who refused to behave in an unethical and
often illegal manner and were discharged as a result, initiated the wrongful
discharge doctrine, particularly the tort-based public policy strain. See infra
notes 258-59, 265-69. Wrongful discharge is not a satisfactory solution to the
problem because it generally redresses employer retaliation only for refusal to
engage in illegal conduct, as distinguished from unethical conduct. In its nar-
rowest form, public policy must be derived from some clear public policy man-
date, preferably embodied in legislation. See Bastress, A Synthesis and a
Proposal for Reform of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 90 W. VA. L. REv.
319, 331 (1988). See generally Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Em-
ployer May Discharge At-Will Employee For Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4TH 544,
582-98 (1982) (discussing tort-based public policy wrongful discharge doctrine).
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of their work.221 The avalanche of scholarly interest and criti-
cism2 2 2 directed at the Yeshiva decision is thus quite under-
standable; the Court's decision made dear that the law was not
even prepared to recognize that college faculty were capable of
possessing independent interests in their work.
The conception of the worker/manager as a servant who
owes an undivided duty of loyalty to his master persisted for
decades before the courts imposed any reciprocal obligation on
capital. For many years the law adhered to the rule that em-
ployers could dismiss employees at will "for good cause, for no
cause, or even for cause morally wrong," without violating the
law.
2 2 3
C. MiDDLE-LEVEL EMPLOYEES SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED
TO THE LEVELING PROCESSES OF UNIONISM
A third justification advanced for the exclusion of middle-
level employees from the Act's coverage is that it was "wrong"
to subject them to the leveling processes of unionism, which in-
clude seniority, uniformity, and standardization. 224 The first
fallacy of this justification for the blanket exclusion of middle-
level employees developed by Congress and the Court, is that
middle-level employees could never be "subjected to" the level-
ing processes of unionism except on their own initiative and au-
thorization. 225 If middle-level employees made that choice,
then they must have weighed their options and concluded that
the potential collective benefits outweighed the potential indi-
221. See The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 117. Klare writes that
Yeshiva, in particular, exposes the law's view of employees as individuals
(1) who are powerless and therefore to be directed by others; (2)
whose inherent, human capacity to learn and to generate knowledge
is largely irrelevant to their productive functions; and (3) who possess
no autonomous interest in or distinct perspective on workplace gov-
ernance except a narrow self-interest in wage and benefits
improvement.
I& at 111.
222. See supra note 148.
223. Blades, supra note 13, at 1405 (citing Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81
Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Hutton v. Wa-
ters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915)(emphasis added)).
224. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1947), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 93, at 307-08. The Report states, in relevant
part: "Supervisors are management people .... It seems wrong, and it is
wrong, to subject people of this kind, who have demonstrated their initiative,
their ambition and their ability to get ahead, to the levelling processes of sen-
iority, uniformity and standardization that [are fundamental to unionism]."
Id.; see also supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing supervisors).




The objection that middle-level employees might be pres-
sured into joining already established units of rank-and-file
workers is easily met. If middle-level employees are in fact suf-
ficiently self-motivated that they should not be subjected to or
even need unionism, it follows that they will possess the
strength of will to resist unionism if that is their desire. Fur-
ther, if the interests of middle-level employees and the rank
and file are truly divergent in a particular workplace, the
Board's unit determination processes could be utilized to pre-
vent middle-level employees from being included in units with
rank-and-file workers.22
Moreover, the notion that unionism of middle-level em-
ployees necessarily entails standardization and leveling is self-
limiting and ignores the experience of professional unions. For
example, although engineering unions have experienced some
leveling effect when pursuing the types of benefits traditionally
sought by industrial unions (such as wage increases, seniority
for layoff, job security provisions, and non-wage financial bene-
fits)2es the attainment of other demands that are often of equal
or more importance to employees entails very little "leveling"
and actually encourages individual achievement. The opportu-
nity for unions to serve individual interests is particularly great
when the employee's individual professional objectives are in
potential conflict with those of the organization. In this situ-
226. Cf. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 702 (1980) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the fact that Yeshiva faculty voted for unionization indi-
cates that it did not perceive its interests as aligned with those of
management).
227. Under NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988), the Board may certify a
union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit only when
a majority of the employees in a unit "appropriate" for collective bargaining
select the union. The Board interprets this as requiring that it group together
only employees who possess substantial mutual interests in wages, hours, and
other conditions of employment. See, e.g., Gustave Fisher, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B.
1069, 1073 (1981). In most cases, the Board inquires into whether the employ-
ees share a similar community of interests. See, e.g., Brown & Root, Inc., 258
N.L.R.B. 1002, 1004 (1981). The Supreme Court has approved the Board's
"community of interest" standard. See NLRB v. Action Automotive, 469 U.S.
490, 496 (1985); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 185-87 (1958).
228. Levitan & Gallo, Collective Bargaining and Private Sector Profession-
als, 112 MoNTHLY LAB. REV. 24, 29-30 (1989).
229. See Strauss, Professional or Employee-Oriented: Dilemma for Engi-
neering Unions, 17 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 519, 527 (1964). For example,
although a scientist values the advancement and dissemination of knowledge
for its own benefit, her employer may direct the scientist to areas that are
likely to yield the highest profit. In addition, where the scientist may wish to
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ation, the union may pursue the interests of the collective with-
out fear of any leveling effect. Some common items on the
bargaining agenda for professional unions include persuading
the employer to: provide opportunities for attending profes-
sional meetings and for educational leave, pay dues for mem-
bership in professional societies, authorize the publication of
research concerning matters that arguably are not trade
secrets, permit the reading of professional literature on com-
pany time, and supply competent support services. 230
More fundamentally, the "leveling" justification for ex-
cluding middle-level employees from NLRA coverage does not
ring true. Masquerading as a concern for the welfare of mid-
dle-level employees themselves, the argument in reality is bot-
tomed on a fear that unionism threatens capitalistic values
because it discourages individual achievement.231 After all, the
leveling argument is not unique to middle-level employees; it is
equally applicable to rank-and-file workers.232 Restricting
publish, her employer may preclude publication to protect trade secrets. Fi-
nally, where the worker may think of her supervisors as senior colleagues and
accordingly feel free to criticize those seniors, the employer usually expects
the subordinate to obey the supervisor without question. I&L; see also Rabban,
Can American Labor Law Accommdate Collective Bargaining by Professional
Employees? 99 YALE L.J. 689, 691 (1990) (stating that professional employees
also seek protection for traditional professional values, including participation
in policy making, the establishment of professional standards, and the commit-
ment of organizational resources to professional goals).
230. Strauss, supra note 229, at 527-28.
231. See supra text accompanying note 99; see also Rabban, supra note 148,
at 1778, 1791 (arguing that the NLRA and key decisions interpreting it are
predicated on the assumption that conflicts of interest and divided loyalties
could impair job performance of the most crucial employees, and ultimately
destroy the structure of American capitalism).
232. To the extent that Congress and the Court believe that middle manag-
ers are unique, it is because they are "those best qualified to get ahead." See
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 16-17 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 93, at 307-08. This notion - a vision of "Superman" the
supervisor emerging from the common herd of workers - appears to be a
form of social Darwinism. The workplace naturally assumes a hierarchial
structure, with that class of workers who are less intelligent or lazy at the bot-
tom of the pyramid, while those at the middle and top possess talent and en-
ergy. See Axelson & Dail, The Changing Character of Homelessness in the
United States, 37 FAM. RELAT. 463, 464 (1988) (describing philosophers' adop-
tion of Darwin's theory of natural selection, its adaptation to a socioeconomic
philosophy, and its use in the Protestant work ethic philosophies of Max
Weber). This is certainly one of the least attractive features of capitalism, re-
flecting class bias and existing in considerable tension with the constitutional
value of equality. See Atleson, supra note 9, at 841 & n.1 (positing that our
reluctance to acknowledge or discuss issues of economic or political power may
stem in part from our commitment to constitutional values of equality). For a
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unionization to the rank and file does, however, tend to check
the spread of unionism. Middle-level employees are likely to be
among the most educated and articulate members of the em-
ployee pool. Further, because Taylorism has not yet robbed
them of all knowledge and power over their work product,2
and because they have been socialized to believe they are pow-
erful,2- 4 they are the most likely to feel sufficiently confident
to assert their interests vigorously.
Finally, the exclusion of middle-level employees from
NLRA protection as a means of defending capitalistic values
may simply be a smokescreen the elite use to maintain their
stranglehold on wealth in American society. Some have argued
that the New Deal, including the Wagner Act, represented a
strategy by the elite to strengthen and revitalize American capi-
talism rather than to undercut it.2 The Communist Party op-
posed the Act, as did the American Civil Liberties Union, on
the grounds that the Act was designed to discourage strikes and
to preserve the status quo by channeling conflict into more so-
cially acceptable systems. 236 The exclusion of middle-level em-
ployees from the Act's coverage is thus more consistent with an
attempt by capital to maintain control over the working class
than it is with an effort to promote capitalism among the ranks
of middle-level employees.
perceptive and disturbing discussion of the liberal values that lie at the bottom
of the urge to protect rather than to empower the underclass and thereby pre-
serve the status quo, see W. RYAN, supra note 78, at 6-11, 26-30.
233. See supra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
234. See infra notes 346, 370-73 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Block, Beyond Corporate Liberalism, 24 Soc. PRoBs. 352, 352
(1976-77). Atleson describes this view as follows:
Business opposition [to the Act] is viewed as basically a small-firm
phenomenon, while large corporations are seen as proponents of
greater state intervention in an economy threatened by economic col-
lapse as well as by working class militancy. This view is based on a
reversal of perception about twentieth-century liberalism; it is, under
this view, a "movement of enlightened capitalists to save the corpo-
rate order."
J. ATLESON, supra note 52, at 42-43 (footnote omitted) (quoting Block, supra,
at 352). Atleson himself does not support this view. Although acknowledging
that business leaders supported the New Deal legislation, he asserts that the
primary support for the Act came not from business or from labor, but from
within government. Further, a number of large businesses actively opposed
the legislation, represented by the National Association of Manufacturers. He
concludes that the New Deal was not the result of a careful strategy by corpo-
rate leaders to control the political process. Id. at 43.
236. See J. ATLESON, supra note 52, at 196-97 n.44.
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D. MIDDLE-LEVEL EMPLOYEES Do NOT NEED PROTECTION
The final justification - that middle-level employees do
not need the protection of the NLRA because they are suffi-
ciently powerful to protect their own interests - is the most il-
logical. The two interrelated components of this argument are
that middle-level employees have demonstrated their ability to
take care of themselves without the necessity of relying on col-
lective action, and that middle-level employees voluntarily
abandoned the security of the collective and assumed the risk
of non-coverage. 237
Even in 1947, when Congress passed Taft-Hartley, supervi-
sors were telegraphing their willingness to rely on collective ac-
tion for protection by joining supervisors' unions.238 With the
rise of scientific management during the 1940s, supervisors who
saw their autonomy being threatened manifested a growing
union-consciousness.e 9 The War Labor Board reported a major
upsurge in union activity by supervisors at this time.24 By 1945
the Public Opinion Index for Industry revealed that seventy-
one percent of foremen favored the idea of unionization.2 1
Concern about the need of middle-level employees for pro-
tection, particularly job security protection, made its way into
the legal literature during the 1960s. In 1964, Andrew Hacker
addressed the assumption of risk argument.m He worried
about the seduction of America's "corporate middle class" by il-
lusory promises of future gains that were not backed by en-
forceable promises of job security. 3 He was particularly
concerned about the effect this phenomenon had on a demo-
cratic society founded on a pluralist model that assumed a wide
dispersion of power among many groups. Hacker reasoned
that, unlike the "old middle class," the new corporate middle
class lacked the defenses of union representation or the oppor-
237. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess. 16-17, reprinted in LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supnz note 93, at 307-08. See supra text accompanying note
99.
238. See Seitz, supra note 8, at 202.
239. IdA. at 204-05. Unionization of the rank and file posed a substantial
threat to supervisors' power, as unionized workers gained more control over
their futures in the enterprise, the supervisors' discretion over the rank and
file slipped away. Id. at 205-06.
240. Id. at 209 (citing Report of the War Labor Board's Foremen's Panel, 16
L.R.RM. (BNA) 2511 (1945)).
241. Id. at 211 (citing Foremen Warm Up to Union, Bus. WEEK, May 4,
1957, at 57).




tunity for meaningful political input, leaving it totally depen-
dent on the continued goodwill of employers.244 Hacker voiced
the suspicion that the economy could not long continue to sup-
port so many layers of management and staff, or "white collar
employees," and predicted: 'Were all the white-collar water to
be wrung out of the corporate world the task of blotting it up
might well be insurmountable, and there would be every likeli-
hood of political repercussions that would test the viability of
democracy."224s
Hacker also expressed the view that white-collar employ-
ees are more vulnerable to the loss of security, status, and self-
esteem that follow job termination than are blue-collar employ-
ees. 4  Hacker's concern for the psychological state of middle-
level employees echoed that of the well-known humanist Erich
Fromm.24 7 Fromm, concerned that the "new middle class,"
composed primarily of managers, supervisors, and professionals,
was increasingly separate from ownership interests, focused on
the alienation this group experienced.2  Separated from own-
ership by principles of scientific management, the manager's
job was to use profitably the capital others invested.249 Fromm
recommended involvement in decision-making to combat feel-
ings of alienation.2 °
In 1969, Lawrence Blades pointed out that middle-level em-
ployees typically were protected neither by collective bargain-
ing agreements nor by individual contracts.2ze The relative lack
of employee mobility made employees vulnerable to discharge,
244. 1I
245. I& at 9.
246. Id
247. See E. FROMM, suprm note 77, at 99-100.
248. Id. at 124-27. A federal government task force also recognized the syn-
drome of "white collar woes" and the growing discontent among managers.
See SPECiAL TASK FoRCE TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE: WORK IN AMERiCA xvi-xvii (1973).
249. E. FROMM, supm note 77, at 124-27; H. BRAvERMAN, supra note 184, at
57 (arguing that the new relations of production, introduced by the capitalist,
force workers to surrender their interest in the labor process, which has be-
come "alienated").
250. E. FROMM, supra note 77, at 299-307, 322-23. Fromm's conclusions are
echoed by the observations of a more contemporary writer, Gail Sheehy.
Sheehy notes that the most "dispirited" employees are in middle management,
while the most "satisfied" hold decision-making positions. G. SHEEHY, PATH-
FINDERS 19 (1981).
251. Blades, supra note 13, at 1411-12. Because only the unusually valuable
employee had sufficient bargaining power to obtain a guarantee in an individ-
ual contract that he would be discharged only for cause, Blades concludes that
individually-negotiated limitations on the employer's right of discharge were
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employer coercion in its quintessential form. 2 Moreover, even
employees who were not discharged remained subject to less
drastic threats, short of discharge, which the employer might
utilize to "bend the will of his employee to his own."253 Thus,
the non-union employee became a "docile follower of his em-
ployer's every wish."2'
Blades lamented the law's failure to close the gap in pro-
tection for non-union workers created by the exclusion of mid-
dle-level employees from NLRA coverage.2 Blades argued
that there existed a continuing imbalance of power between the
middle-level employee and his employer - the same imbalance
that produced unionism. The increasing concentration of
power in the hands of fewer employers aggravated this imbal-
ance.2 Blades recommended establishment of a damage rem-
edy for abusive discharge.2 7
Blades's writings were prophetic. At least thirty states
have judicially created exceptions to the employment at-will
doctrine.2 5 These exceptions have become the body of law gen-
erally referred to as "wrongful discharge law." The three ex-
ceptions to the rule that an employer may discharge employees
at will include the public policy exception, the implied contract
exception, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.2 9 Experience has shown that these exceptions are much
more likely to support a cause of action by a middle-level em-
ployee than by an employee whose wage is not high enough to
justify such an action.26°
not a promising means of solving the problem of employer coercion. Id. at
1412.
252. Id at 1405-06.
253. I&
254. Id at 1405.
255. Id. at 1404-05 (footnotes omitted).
256. Id.
257. Id
258. See Annotation, supra note 18, at 552-604. There may be as many as
46 states that have recognized the doctrine, at least in dicta. See Employment
at Wil" State Rulings Chart, supra note 30, at 550: 51-52.
259. For a description of these forms of action, see Note, Hybrid Employ-
ees: Defining and Protecting Employees Ecluded from the Coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act, 41 VAND. L. REV. 601, 622-24 (1988).
260. See Note, supra note 29, at 1940 (arguing that despite their supposedly
greater bargaining power, many plaintiffs in public policy cases are from upper
management; reporting that a 1982 study of 46 public policy cases revealed
that a majority of plaintiffs were managerial); Steiber, Recent Developments in
Employnent-At-Will, 36 LAB. L. J. 557, 558 (1985); see also Geyelin, Fired
Managers Winning More Lawsuits, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 1989, at B-I, col. 3.
The Wall Street Journal noted-
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The argument that middle-level employees do not need
protection because of their superior bargaining power is belied
not only by the fact that wrongful discharge law developed, but
by its dramatic growth in the last decade.26 ' The number of at-
will employees terminated unjustly has been estimated to be
between 50,000 to 200,000 per year.26 2 In late 1989, more than
25,000 wrongful discharge cases were pending in state and fed-
eral courts.263
Moreover, a sampling of the reported cases indicates that
employers have not hesitated to discharge middle and upper
level managers and supervisors for reasons that would have
been protected as "concerted activity" had the discharged
worker been a covered employee under the NLRA.2 4 The
motivations for the discharges in these cases run the gamut, in-
All kinds of white-collar workers are filing these suits, whether
they're making $30,000 or $300,000 a year ......
Money is a big reason. With high salaries, lucrative stock options,
hefty bonus plans and retirement packages and other benefits on the
line, white-collar workers have more to lose by being fired and more
resources with which to pay lawyers. A Rand study released last year
surveyed 120 wrongful discharge cases that went to trial in California
between 1980 and 1986. The average salary of fired employees was
$36,254.
Id. at B-1, col. 4-5.
261. According to a Bureau of National Affairs study, wrongful discharge
cases more than doubled between 1982 and 1987. Geyelin, supra note 260, at
B-1, col. 4.
262. Lopatka, supra note 18, at 2 (citing Steiber, The Case for Protection of
Unorganized Employees Against Unfair Discharge, 32 PROC. ANN. MEETING
INDUS. REL. REs. Ass'N 160-61 (1980)). Steiber estimates that of 2 million
workers discharged annually who aren't covered by employment contracts or
collective bargaining agreements, 150,000 are fired annually without just cause.
Steiber, supra note 260, at 558.
263. Geyelin, supra note 260, at B-1, col. 4.
264. NLRA Section 8(a)(1) provides a remedy for employer conduct which
interferes with, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of Section 7
rights; Section 7 protects employees' rights to engage in concerted activities for
mutual aid or protection. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 157 (1988). "Con-
certed activity" by a single employee in the context of the assertion of statu-
tory rights is limited to activity engaged in "with, or on the authority of, other
employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself." Meyers
Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984), rev'd sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755
F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985), on remand, 281 N.L.R.B.
88 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988). By contrast, Section 7 protects a single em-
ployee's assertion of a right contained in a collective bargaining agreement as a
"concerted activity" because it is considered an extension of the concerted ac-
tivity that produced the agreement, and thus the assertion of such a right af-
fects the rights of all employees the agreement covers. NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 837 (1984).
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cluding such varied reasons as a refusal to cooperate with the
employer in its violation of local health and safety regula-
tions,265 a store manager's attempt to protect the lives of the
employees he supervised,266 a black supervisor's involvement in
a class action suit for race discrimination,2 7 a manager's deci-
sion to file an EEOC claim against the employer in which the
discharged manager sought and obtained the support of other
employees, 26s and engaging in union organizing activity.269
Finally, if middle-level employees have "assumed the risk"
of individual rather than collective action, the real question is
whether it is only middle-level employees who are at risk. Pit-
ting middle-level employees against the rest of the laboring
class penalizes individual middle-level employees, who bear the
risk of loss of employment. In addition, the polarization of mid-
dle-level employees hurts the rank and file, who lose the sup-
port of the middle-level employee class. Finally, pitting
middle-level employees against the rest of the laboring class pe-
nalizes society as a whole, risking decreased productivity, alien-
ation, increased burdens on the unemployment, welfare and
judicial systems, and a political system that is democratic in
265. See Balog v. LRJV, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 3d 1295, 1298-99, 250 Cal. Rptr.
766, 767 (1988) (noting that supervisor's complaint for retaliatory discharge
was based on his report that the employer was not complying with minimum
safety standards, his refusal to assign employees to jobs exposing them to the
risks resulting from failure to meet safety standards, his refusal to cooperate
in the illegal disposition of toxic waste, his refusal to falsify accident reports,
and his refusal to manufacture false reasons supporting the discharge of pro-
bationary employees to prevent them from joining the union).
266. See Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 922-23, 436
A.2d 1140, 1143-44 (1981) (holding that manager who allowed employees to
leave company funds in the safe overnight, resulting in substantial loss during
a burglary, was improperly terminated for negligence in following company
policy;, contending that manager furthered public policy by attempting to pro-
tect employees who were fearful of making deposits after defendant sus-
pended police protection for them).
267. See Taitt v. Chemical Bank, 849 F.2d 775, 778 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that black bank manager discharged after 24 years of employment in retalia-
tion for his resistance to a proposed settlement of Title VII action brought by
black professionals at the bank established prima facie case under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1982)).
268. See Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 729 (5th Cir.) (finding that
EEOC manager may not maintain Equal Pay Act claim against employer who
discharged her in retaliation for filing EEOC claim, for encouraging others to
do so, and for seeking to maintain a class action against the employer), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1986).
269. See American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 893, 897 (7th
Cir. 1981) (holding that discharge of shift managers at fast food restaurant for
engaging in union organizational activity did not violate NLRA because em-
ployees were "supervisors" not covered by the Act).
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name only. These questions should prompt a reexamination
and restructuring of our labor laws. The next section attempts
that.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXCLUSION OF MIDDLE-
LEVEL EMPLOYEES FROM NLRA COVERAGE
FOR FEDERAL LABOR POLICY
A. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GOAiS OF LABOR LAW Is
FRUSTRATED
1. Industrial Peace
Neither Congress nor the Court has ever sought to justify
the exclusion of middle-level employees from NLRA coverage
by direct reference to the Act's goal of industrial peace.2 70 In-
deed, the Court has been extensively criticized because its ex-
clusion of managerial employees is incompatible with the goal
of achieving industrial peace.0'? In his dissent in Yeshiva,272
Justice Brennan noted that the Yeshiva decision undermined
the goal of funneling industrial disputes into collective bargain-
ing, leaving non-covered managerial employees to self-help
remedies.2 3 Similarly, one commentator has pointed out that
because Yeshiva did not hold that faculty unionization is illegal,
the employer's ability to ignore any union formed or to fire
faculty members for joining it depends entirely on the union's
economic and political clout.2 4 Thus, "[ain ironic consequence
of Yeshiva is that it invites faculty and potentially other em-
ployees to go outside the legal process to protect their
interests."275
Nevertheless, the congressional exclusion of supervisors
and the Court's exclusion of managers and certain confidential
employees proceed on the unstated assumption that exclusion
270. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
271. See supra note 148.
272. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 691 (1980)(Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). See supra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
273. Id at 705 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 499 (1979)).
274. The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 106 n.*.
275. Id. Klare refers here to the possibility that middle managers who can-
not resort to the Board's processes, collective bargaining, or arbitration of em-
ployee grievances, may be forced to use strikes, sit-down strikes, slowdowns,
and other forms of peaceful economic pressure to advance their demands. Id.
Klare notes that although this may be a positive development in the long run
because it encourages non-covered employees to rely on their own group
strength, that possibility provides "small consolation" in view of the tremen-
dous defeat in Yeshiva. Id.
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will ultimately produce industrial peace. "Industrial peace,"
however, is not defined in its ideal sense. Instead, it refers to a
peace based on middle-level employees' domination of the rank
and file. By subduing the workers beneath them, these non-un-
ionized front line workers aid in maintaining "peace," which re-
ally means avoidance of profit-interrupting strikes. For
example, the 80th Congress believed that owners must have on
their side loyal, non-union men "to assign people to their work,
to see that they keep at their work and do it well, to correct
them when they are at fault, and to settle their complaints and
grievances."' ' 6 Similarly, the Yeshiva Court asserted that uni-
versities were entitled to "rely on their faculties to participate
in the making and implementation of their policies."2 77
This conception of industrial peace is premised on the no-
tion that the workplace must be organized in a hierarchical
fashion to be productive and efficient. It assumes that chain-of-
command forms of organization cannot coexist with coopera-
tion between workers rather than subordination of one class of
workers to another, and ultimately the subordination of all
classes of workers to the capital-controlling elite. Placement of
rank-and-file workers at the bottom of the hierarchy has been
justified because workers who execute work as opposed to con-
ceiving it do not possess learning and knowledge-generating ca-
pabilities, or, at best, those abilities are not relevant to their
productive functions. Such conceptual functions belong solely
to management.2 8
Klare persuasively argues that labor law reinforces these
hierarchical notions by cloaking worker domination in the
more acceptable garb of majority rule, which occurs through
collective bargaining.2 9 The NLRA induces worker consent to
the hierarchical, authoritarian nature of the workplace, and to
the prerogative of private capital to control the production pro-
cess and dispose of the products of labor.28o Kare asserts
276. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong, 1st sess. 16, reprinted in LEGISLA.
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 93, at 307.
277. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 689 (1980) (footnote omitted).
278. See The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 114.
279. Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 57, at 458-59. Kare argues that col-
lective bargaining thus takes on a "law making" function. Id.
280. Klare explains: "Collective bargaining law is only marginally con-
cerned with worker input or participation in significant industrial decisions.
Its real preoccupations are with efficient management of the enterprise, with
establishing a governance process that 'promote[s] industrial stabilization,'




bluntly that, under current law, collective bargaining operates
as "a system for inducing workers to participate in their own
domination by managers and those whom managers serve."2s1
Nonlegal observers also have noticed the co-opting effect of
worker participation schemes, such as the NLRA, in a capitalis-
tic society. Jacques Ellul has argued persuasively that the pro-
vision for worker input is part of a technique that has as its
ultimate goal the reduction of worker hostility.2 s 2 He con-
cludes that labor unions only operate to aid workers in submit-
ting to the conditions from which unions had originally hoped
to free them.2s s Christopher Lasch scorns illusions of democ-
racy and participation as forms of "therapeutic authority" that
ultimately undermine the self-sufficiency of the individual.22 4
Moreover, labor law doctrine has strayed even from the
NLRA's original co-optation function.285 Klare notes that the
Court departed abruptly from its policy of labor co-optation in
Yeshiva, in which it "bluntly and unceremoniously extin-
guished the legal rights of hundreds of thousands of employ-
ees."28 Klare fears that the collective bargaining system is ripe
281. Id- at 459-61 (footnotes omitted). Another legal scholar describes the
co-optation effect of labor law in gentler terms: "[American labor law] institu-
tionalizes and constricts the struggles of workers, helping them accept their
own subordinate role in a capitalist society." Abraham, Individual Autonomy
and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law: Union Membership Resignations
and Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1277 (1988).
282. J. ELLUL, THE TECHNoLOGICAL SocnETY 351-52 (1967).
283. Id. at 358. Ellul believes that labor unions, like human relations ex-
perts and industrial psychologists, serve a tranquilizing function for workers
and give them illusions of possessing some control when, in fact, machines and
the push toward productivity are in the driver's seat. Id. at 356. Ellul reasons
that productivity can be improved by reducing the human factor of hostility
and the randomness that it injects into the workplace. Because a hostile
worker will not work as hard or as efficiently as one who is made to feel a part
of the community of interest, capital must concern itself with worker morale
and related problems of social and psychological well-being. Id. at 351-52. Un-
ions, supposedly the champions of the workers, in fact occupy themselves
searching for solutions in ways which do not seriously disrupt the system.
They, too, are devoted to maintaining the status quo. Id. at 82.
284. C. LASCH, CULTURE OF NARcmissM 315 (1979).
285. See, e.g., The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 99 (arguing that
collective bargaining is a means to "channel and institutionalize industrial con-
flict, thereby containing and defusing it").
286. Id at 104. Klare asserts that Yeshiva signals a change in the ideology
of collective bargaining away from an integrative, co-optative approach, and to-
ward repression. Id. Kare's reference to "repression" refers to his earlier de-
scription in the same work of the two elite approaches to labor law. The first
is "basically repressive", and therefore grudging toward recognition of em-
ployee rights, while the second is the co-optation model of labor law. Id. at 99.
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for and vulnerable to reforms that will bolster productivity and
channel dissension by providing an illusion of democracy.2 7
Several writers have suggested such reforms.m88
In short, the NLRA is "simultaneously liberating and coop-
tive" for workers.289 Although providing unions with a foot-
hold in basic industries that had previously been successful in
fighting them off, the Act also has operated to establish a new
avenue through which the rank and file can be controlled.290
In other words, industrial peace has been achieved through
domination. The Act functions as the opiate for the masses, op-
erating to keep workers just satisfied enough so they will not
revolt, but stopping short of conferring any real power upon
them.
Our industrial "peace" is not the sort of peace the drafters
of the Wagner Act envisioned. They foresaw a peace born of a
compromise of power between the two forces in industry, capi-
tal and labor.2 1 Congress' premise was that the Wagner Act
would operate to restore power to labor and thus to equalize
the bargaining power of the two forces. 2  This balance of
power would prevent employers from dominating workers and
would lead ultimately to fair bargaining and to the attainment
of labor contracts acceptable to both capital and labor.293 In
short, it would be possible to attain labor peace in a democratic
fashion, without paying the high price of worker domination.
Critical to the attainment of industrial peace in a democ-
racy, then, is bargaining between two equally powerful forces.
Because these forces have conflicting interests, their relation-
287. Id at 124. In other words, a version of collective bargaining might
evolve which would enable workers to have input into capital's decisions
where the interests of labor and capital converge (e.g., increasing productiv-
ity), but not where those interests diverge (e.g., improvements in wages or
working conditions which diminish capital's share of the profits or decrease
productivity).
288. See, e.g., Gregory, Lessons from Publius for Contemporary Labor Law,
38 ALA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1986) (stating that workplace hierarchy recognizes the
"legitimate distinction" between ownership and labor); Kohler, Models of
Worker Participation. The Uncertain Signifwance of Section 8(a)(2), 27
B.C.L. REV. 499, 518 (1986) (contending that participatory models, as distin-
guished from collective bargaining, leave ultimate control of the order of the
employment relationship with management; their goal is organizational effec-
tiveness, not employee self-determination).
289. D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 188, at 165.
290. Id.; see Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 57, at 463.
291. See supra note 58.
292. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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ship will necessarily be adversarial, at least in the short
term.2 The adversarial nature of the relationship, and the dis-
plays of power that are likely to accompany a struggle for con-
trol between two roughly equal forces, are not necessarily
inconsistent with achieving industrial peace. "Power" need not
connote hierarchy and oppression. It is not always relative, and
need not be purchased through coercion, at another's ex-
pense.295 The exercise of power without domination, in the
context of adversarial bargaining will likely produce interest-
based bargaining296 and, ultimately, will result in labor con-
tracts that benefit both parties.m The line between the adver-
saries, however, must be clear because the adversarial system
of collective bargaining assumes the existence of mutually ex-
clusive groups of employers and employees.PI
The line between capital and labor has become increasingly
blurred since enactment of the Wagner Act.m The ideal of a
true labor peace has become a fantasy. As more "hybrid"
workers are shunted across the line separating covered from
non-covered employees because they are "aligned with manage-
ment,"30° industrial peace becomes more a matter of domina-
tion of rank-and-file employees by their "superiors." These
superiors are no longer confined to capital, but now are com-
posed primarily of middle-level workers. Hence, the industrial
peace that reigns today is indeed the product of co-optation.
Worse still, the remnants of the adversarial underpinnings of
the NLRA remain, leaving us with the worst of both worlds:
294. See Gregory, supra note 288, at 16 (arguing that labor relations histori-
cally have been premised on good faith, although they have been conducted in
essentially adversarial, arms-length collective bargaining). Over the long haul,
however, the interests of capital and labor may converge. See infra note 297.
295. See N. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER 210-26 (describing the
views of several feminist scholars who urge the reconsideration of assumptions
that power is equivalent to domination, and argue instead that power is associ-
ated with capacity, competence, and energy).
296. See generally R. FISHER & W. URY, GETrING TO YES (1981) (describing
process of interest-based bargaining that focuses on the merits and looks for
mutual gains, without posturing).
297. For example, a powerful union with strong support from its members
might concede on many issues at the bargaining table in an effort to aid own-
ership in fighting off foreign competition. The union concedes, then, not be-
cause it is weaker than ownership, but instead because it is in the joint
interests of capital and labor for it to do so.
298. See Note, Hybrid Employees: Defining and Protecting Employees Ex-
cluded from the Coverage of the National Labor Relations Act, 41 VAND. L.
REv. 601, 602 (1988).
299. See supra notes 81-168 and accompanying text.
300. See Note, supra note 298, at 602.
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hierarchy and domination, combined with structural barriers to
cooperation in the workplace.30'
2. Worker Empowerment
The exclusion of middle-level employees from NLRA cov-
erage is patently inconsistent with the goal of worker empower-
ment.30 2  The stratification of labor into workers and
management is simply "a cover for the forcible 'alignment'
(read: subordination) of [managers to capital].1303 Indeed, as
Yeshiva and COMS make clear,304 the goal of the NLRA is to
empower workers only to the point where they have, by effec-
tive political mobilization, achieved a modicum of democratic
power on the job, at which time they lose the Act's protec-
tions.30 5 Thus, the labor laws penalize employees for successful
collective bargaining and ensure that the most powerful em-
ployees are alienated and isolated from the remainder of the la-
boring class.
Further, the decline in the strength of organized labor rela-
tive to ownership means that because of its superior power,
capital can take a larger share of the economic pie relative to
labor as a whole. Union gains, then, are achieved at the ex-
pense of non-unionized workers rather than at the expense of
ownership.306 Pitting worker against worker engenders hostil-
ity between classes of workers, exacerbates problems of aliena-
tion and isolation, and reinforces the stratification of labor.
301. See generally Stone, supra note 5 (discussing barriers to worker par-
ticipation in the NLRA).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
303. The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 119.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 129-49.
305. . at 113. Kare points out that Yeshiva creates a paradox for em-
ployees: if they are successful enough through collective bargaining to achieve
a measure of workplace power, they may have simply bargained themselves
out of the legal impetus that the employer has to bargain, namely, NLRA pro-
tections. Id
306. See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (1900)
(Holmes, C.J., dissenting). As Holmes observed:
It [is] pure phantasy to suppose that there is a body of capital of which
labor, as a whole, secures a larger share [by means of organization and
strikes] .... Organization and strikes may get a larger share for the
members of an organization, but, if they do, they get it at the expense
of the less organized and less powerful portion of the laboring mass.




Industrial democracy, one of the foremost goals of the
NLRA,30 7 is assuredly not served by denying hundreds of
thousands of workers a voice in the arena in which their voice
would sound loudest: the workplace. Middle-level employees
are disenfranchised. They cannot be represented by unions,
and their interests are not congruent with those of capital.308
As their numbers grow, and as the proportion of the labor force
that they constitute increases, the NLRA model increasingly
fails to satisfy the element of democracy that requires represen-
tation of all or most of those governed.309
Moreover, the problem of worker alienation, which the
NLRA's injection of democracy into the workplace was to re-
dress, is still with us. Most workers today do not find fulfill-
ment in the world of work; the phenomenon of alienation Karl
Marx identified more than a century ago310 is more entrenched
than ever.3 11 One observer writes:
A profound malaise of spirit afflicts many workers. Misery,
meaninglessness, deep dissatisfaction, and often inarticulable impov-
erishment of purpose plague even many of the most "successful," es-
pecially if "success" is measured only by conventional norms of
monetary remuneration in late capitalist society. It has long been axi-
omatic that most persons who work for a living... dread Monday
morning. This poignantly simple description of the world of work en-
capsulates much of the contemporary tragedy of labor.3 12
Although alienation has always been a problem among un-
ionized, rank-and-file workers,313 it was not perceived as a con-
cern for middle-level employees until recently. The changing
economy, and its concomitant bureaucratization, automation
and technological changes, tends "to turn the white collar
307. See supra text accompanying notes 69-80.
308. See Willborn, supra note 56, at 734.
309. Id at n.85 & accompanying text.
310. Karl Marx noted that alienation is the single most enduring problem
afflicting the working world. K. MEARx, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL MANU-
SCRIPTS OF 1844, COLLECTED WORKS 110-11 (D. Strunk ed. 1964).
311. See Gregory, Catholic Labor Law Theory, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 119,
123 (1988).
312. I& at 122.
313. Alienation continues to plague organized labor, despite some recent
signs of resuscitation. See Gregory, supra note 311, at 124 ("More often than
not, unionized workers continue to be cruelly deceived by the false promise of
employee profit sharing and participatory workplace democracy... Most of
these ownership-initiated schemes of supposed workplace democracy have
thus far deceived workers and have failed to halt the continued impoverish-
ment of workers' spirits" (footnote omitted)).
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gray."3 14 Middle-level employees, like unionized workers, suf-
fer from alienation.315 Non-unionized middle-level employees
are victims of their own individualistic philosophy. They are
especially vulnerable to alienation and to the potential psycho-
logical devastation accompanying job loss because their expec-
tations of achieving a meaningful work life are much higher
than those of their blue collar brothers and sisters.316
As white collar workers confront their inability to control
their destinies,317 they have turned to the courts for help rather
than to their fellow workers.318 Resort to the individual rem-
edy of wrongful discharge has done little to combat the feelings
of powerlessness and alienation that middle-level employees
and the rank and file alike share.
The social costs of alienation at work are high.3 19 They in-
clude drug abuse, absenteeism, and decreased productivity.320
The byproducts of alienation, however, are not confined to the
workplace. Some have linked the increase in violence in Amer-
ican society to alienation.32 ' The antidote for worker alienation
314. Blum, supra note 12, at 126 (positing that change in collar color will
come about as the clerk's dream of upward mobility takes on a greater sense
of unreality, as fears mount concerning job security, and as the clerk recog-
nizes the lack of protection from unilateral management action).
315. See Gregory, supra note 311, at 138.
316. Id at 138; see also Hacker, Introduction: Corporate America, in THE
CoRPORArIoN TAxEOVER, supra note 10, at 8-9 (arguing that when resources
for middle manager positions and salaries become scarce, an inevitable wave of
middle management terminations will have serious personal ramifications be-
cause white collar employees are psychologically unprepared for the loss of
status which accompanies the loss of a job).
317. See P. KING, K. MAYNARD & P. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 57. The
authors note that although income rewards for middle managers are still ex-
tensive, middle managers have obtained these rewards by consenting to a
trade-off in job security; moreover, even the material rewards are being eaten
away by the drive for cost reductions and increased profit. Id. at 58.
318. See supra notes 258-69 and accompanying text. The typical wrongful
discharge plaintiff is
a middle-aged, mid-level, mid-career, male manager who has spent
the majority of his adult life with the former employer. His psycho-
logical devastation is often irreparable .... Once cast adrift by the
now disembodied corporate abstraction, to which they had pledged
their working lives as an almost filial act, these former managers can
be the most pathetic and helpless of victims.
Gregory, supra note 311, at 124.
319. See generally E. FROiM, MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN (1961) (detailing
the tragic consequences of alienation).
320. See Crain, supra note 78, at 1286-1345.
321. See, e.g., R. MAY, LovE AND WILL 30-31 (1969). May equates alienation
with apathy. Id. at 29; see infra note 322. He describes a dialectical relation-
ship between apathy and violence. Violence is a reaction to feelings of apathy.
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is participatory decision-making, a remedy largely unavailable
for middle-level employees under current law.322
B. MOST MIDDLE-LEVEL EMPLOYEES REMAIN VULNERABLE TO
DISCHARGE
1. The Inadequacies of Wrongful Discharge
The principal existing method of protecting the job secur-
ity of middle-level employees is wrongful discharge doctrine.32s
Wrongful discharge, however, poses problems from the
worker's point of view for several reasons. First, availability of
redress depends on the state in which the worker resides be-
cause not all states currently recognize the doctrine.324 Second,
not all of the states that recognize the doctrine will entertain
all of the currently existing theories on which relief may be
available.325 Third, only workers in the upper echelons of man-
agement possess sufficient resources to pursue relief through
litigation.328 Finally, wrongful discharge is an individual rem-
edy, which operates to pit the middle manager against not only
his employer, but other members of the workforce whose con-
tinuing employment ensures their "loyalty."32
Wrongful discharge doctrine also is disadvantageous from
When the inability to affect or even genuinely touch another person becomes
overwhelming, "violence flares up as a daimonic necessity for contact, a mad
drive forcing touch in the most direct way possible." IH at 30-31 (footnote
omitted). In short, "[v]iolence is the ultimate destructive substitute which
surges in to fill the vacuum where there is no relatedness." Id. at 30 (footnote
omitted).
322. Erich Fromm writes: "The worker can become an active, interested
and responsible participant only if he can have influence on the decisions
which bear upon his individual work situation and the whole enterprise. His
alienation from work can be overcome only if... he becomes a responsible
subject who employs capital." E. FROMM, supra note 77, at 281. Fromm's anal-
ysis should not surprise any student of human nature. Alienation is synony-
mous with apathy, or the absence of caring. See R. MAY, supra note 321, at 29
(stating that alienation, anomie, and apathy express a condition in which men
and women experience a distance between themselves and the objects that
used to excite their affection and their will). We naturally tend to ignore
things that are out of our control, while we tend to care - that is, feel respon-
sible for - things that we experience as being within our control. See R. MAy,
MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIMSELF 24-25 (1953).
323. See supra note 18.
324. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
327. I use the term "loyalty" here very narrowly, to refer to the willing-




the employer's perspective. Litigation is costly, time-consum-
ing, and often destroys the morale of the remaining employees
working in the terminated plaintiff's department. It can pro-
duce very large damage awards328 and, because of the vagaries
of juries, its outcome and costs are unpredictable. More funda-
mentally, wrongful discharge perpetuates management by
force, by which the manager's "loyalty" to the enterprise is ob-
tained by threatening discharge. Loyalty and cooperation are
the result of trust, not coercion. Owners thus do not receive
the best work from their managers under a force-based man-
agement style.
Finally, protecting middle-level employees through wrong-
ful discharge doctrine is costly to society. It is costly in a direct
economic sense because wrongful discharge cases occupy a con-
siderable portion of judicial time, clogging the courts, and pre-
empting or delaying resolution of other issues of concern. In
addition, because they are remedial rather than preventative,
wrongful discharge awards result in a drain on our welfare and
unemployment compensation systems.329 Wrongful discharge is
also costly in an indirect economic fashion because wrongful
,discharge remedies exacerbate the problem of worker aliena-
tion, resulting ultimately in a decrease in efficiency and
productivity.330
Leaving the protection of middle-level employees to the va-
garies of wrongful discharge also is costly to society in a moral
sense. The burgeoning public concern with corporate ethics
and our desire to ensure honest corporate practices, particu-
larly in a society controlled by corporations, is inconsistent with
the at-will status of most middle-level employees. Although it
is true that the "public policy" strain of wrongful discharge pro-
vides some protection to society from unethical corporate prac-
328. See infra note 374.
329. By excluding from union membership the relatively powerful middle-
level employees, labor law doctrine ensures that those remaining in the union-
ized work force (or in the unionizable work force that unions have thus far
lacked the power to organize) will continue to lack job security and financial
resources. In addition to the prospect of unemployment, the certainty of low-
paying wages carries with it the threat of homelessness: 20% to 30% of the
homeless population work, but cannot afford a place to live in the area where
they work. National Coalition for the Homeless, Homelessness in the United
States: Background and Federal Response - A Briefing Paper for Congres-
sional Candidates, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE RIGHTS OF THE HOME-
LESS 65, 72 (1988); see also Axelson & Dail, supra note 232, at 465 (stating that
the subpopulation of homeless known as "working poor" is growing).
330. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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tices, it is precious little protection.33 '
2. Federal Regulation Other Than the NLRA Provides Scant
Solace
Federal regulation of the workplace outside the NLRA
typically has been concerned with working conditions rather
than with the most vital employee concern - job security.332
To the extent that federal legislation does concern itself with
job security, remedies are available only to employees in pro-
tected classes.333 The only federal regulation that would osten-
sibly deal with the issue of employment security for most non-
organized workers is the proposed Employment Termination
Act (ETA).33 4 Widely criticized on other grounds, the ETA it-
self explicitly would exclude many categories of employees, in-
cluding those who have responsibility for policy-making
decisions or for directing significant divisions within an enter-
prise.3 3 Thus, middle-level employees can expect little protec-
tion from federal regulation outside the NLRA.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: NLRA COVERAGE FOR
THE ENTIRE LABORING CLASS
A. PREMISES OF THE PROPOSAL
The thesis of this Article is that the similarities between
the working class (rank-and-file employees) and middle-level
employees (supervisory, managerial, and confidential employ-
ees) are far more important than the differences. The rise of
331. See supra note 220.
8ome writers have suggested an addendum to wrongful discharge doctrine
that would prompt employers voluntarily to institute arbitration systems.
These proposals would provide employers with a defense against a wrongful
discharge action if the employer had provided the employee with an opportu-
nity to arbitrate the termination decision, using a "just cause" standard for dis-
charge. See, e.g., Bastress, supra note 220, at 346-50. Despite their good
intentions, such proposals are thinly disguised co-optation schemes: they have
the effect of channeling employee termination cases into a system from which
they will rarely, if ever, emerge victorious. Paid for by the employer, the arbi-
trator can hardly be said to be impartial. And without a union to represent
her, how will the discharged worker be informed of her rights, or be repre-
sented at the arbitration hearing?
332. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Furthermore, governmen-
tel regulation of working conditions is undesirable because it is paternalistic in
character and therefore does nothing to enhance worker empowerment. See
Crain, supra note 78, at 1290-1301.
333. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.




bureaucratic control has broken down the traditional Tayloris-
tic barrier between "head work" and 'hand work." 336 The
work of technical and professional workers, characterized by
the performance of highly specialized, routine tasks, may differ
little from the assembly line.337 The commonality between all
classes of labor has at no time been more pronounced than it is
today. The various fractions of the laboring class338 all lack
control over their labor; all have to work for others and are,
consequently, dependent on those others.3 39 Although the jobs
held by middle-level employees may seem on the surface to dis-
tinguish them from the "working poor," or the "proletariat,"
this difference is due primarily to the higher wages that mid-
dle-level employees receive. ° The economic position of all
fractions of the laboring class thus is essentially identical: they
are dependent, powerless, and inherently subject to economic
instability.341
Today's middle class is beginning to face the same chronic
insecurity of finances, jobs, and lifestyle that has troubled the
working class for decades.34 Of particular concern to middle
sector information managers is the development of new tech-
nology that allows jobs to be done more efficiently and more
cheaply, leaving less room for the unskilled or semi-skilled
worker.33 The technology, however, is not at the root of the
problem. It is instead a symbol of the powerlessness that arises
from an inability to control the means of production.3"
336. See P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 33.
337. Id.
338. For purposes of this discussion, I adopt the terminology found in P.
KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10. The authors identify
three different "fractions" in labor. 1) the working poor (found in jobs with
simple control); 2) the traditional proletariat (manual workers, clericals, and
factory operatives, often ethnically based); and 3) the middle layers (who stand
between all lower-level administrative and production workers on the one
side, and capitalists on the other, and are usually white males). I& at 34 (cit-
ing R. EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORK-
PLACE IN THE TwENTET CENTURY 191-92 (1979)). The authors refer to these
fractions collectively as "the laboring class." Id. at 34.
339. Id.
340. d.
341. Id. at 34.
342. P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 55.
343. Id.; see also J. ATLESON, supra note 52, at 105 (suggesting that technol-
ogy has sometimes been used to control the work process or to eliminate
skilled labor, and that this use often has been overlooked).
344. P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 55; see also
J. ATLESON, supra note 52, at 105 (positing that technical control - designing
machinery and the production process to maximize efficiency - means that
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The similarities between middle-level employees and the
rank and file, however, have not proved to be a sufficient stim-
ulus to all labor to organize collectively. There are three rea-
sons for this. First, low-level participation in corporate
decision-making on an individual level leads to middle sector
cooperation in the oppression of both the working class and the
poor, which tends to be divisive.345 The second reason why all
labor has not been stimulated to organize collectively is that
the structural powerlessness of the middle sector as employees,
and their acceptance of the ideology of individualism, create a
sense of isolation, meaninglessness, and ultimately, aliena-
tion.346 Finally, the labor laws themselves actively discourage
solidarity among classes of workers. 4 7
Elimination of the final factor could go far toward breaking
down the other two barriers to worker solidarity. Some argue
that both the exclusion of supervisors34s and managerial em-
ployees 49 was deliberately intended to isolate these groups
from the more traditional constituencies of organized labor.
worker anger is addressed to the speed of the line rather than to the supervi-
sor, thus, work itself becomes more alienating).
345. P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 61.
346. Id Capital's efforts to impart an ideology of individualism to white-
collar employees have been quite successful. In the 1940s, to combat organiza-
tion by supervisors, owners mounted a publicity campaign designed to "reedu-
cate foremen to their management status and role." Seitz, supra note 8, at 236
& n.125 (citing examples of business articles and advertisements). The idea
was "'to so develop the attitudes of the foreman ... - to so identify him psy-
chologically with the management team - that the mere suggestion of organi-
zation would outrage his sense of loyalty and obligation."' I& (quoting D.
LEVINSON, WARTIME UNIONIZATION OF FOREMEN 447 (1949)(unpublished thesis
in University of Wisconsin Library).
Effects of the campaign still linger. Unions have, for example, exper-
ienced considerable difficulty in organizing professional employees because
white-collar employees identify with the enterprise. In a 1957 study, more
than three-fourths of the white collar employees characterized themselves as
"belonging more with management than with production workers." Blum,
supra note 12, at 126 (citing OPINION RESEARCH CORP., WHITE COLLAR EM-
PLOYEE LOYALTY A-s (1957); see also Decline in Union Membership, 127
(News/Analysis) L.R.RM. (BNA) 210, 211 (Feb. 15, 1988) (reporting that a la-
bor economist questions whether unions can attract young professional em-
ployees because "white collar employees feel uncomfortable with traditional
labor unions").
347. See supra notes 93-168 and accompanying text.
348. See, e.g., Seitz, supra note 8, at 199-200, 242-43 (arguing that employers
deliberately attempted "to return foremen to the status of management's
ideal, reliable agents, as part of an overall offensive by ownership to regain
control of the workplace").
349. See The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 116. Klare expresses
the hope that the Yeshiva decision will startle professors into considering
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This isolation creates a hostile environment between middle
sector employees and labor, inhibits the achievement of indus-
trial democracy by preventing labor from having a voice in de-
cision-making, and ultimately fosters alienation.
There must, of course, be a line drawn to separate those
covered by the NLRA and those not covered.350 That line
should be loyal to the original assumptions underlying the Wag-
ner Act,a3 l a line between capital and labor, rather than be-
tween management and labor.352 I recognize that my proposal
may be viewed as radical.353 For example, it stands in stark
contrast to proposals that, by calling for a redefinition of the
excluded class of supervisorial and managerial employees, sug-
gest drawing the line between labor and management in a dif-
ferent place3a4 I suggest instead that what is required is a
whether they have more in common with industrial workers than they had be-
lieved. I&
350. See supra notes 81-168 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 49-80 and accompanying text.
352. A debate would assuredly arise over who fits within the category of
"capital" or "owner." Constructing a line between ownership and labor will be
a considerably more manageable task than our attempts to distinguish be-
tween management and labor. Ownership, because it devolves from property
law, is a concept with which we are very familiar. Moreover, it is black-and-
white: either one possesses an ownership interest in an enterprise, or one does
not.
The difficult questions would concern the extent of ownership necessary
to exclude one from the category of labor. Some might argue that ownership
of one share of stock would be sufficient. If that were the case, companies
might establish stock ownership plans for employees so as to preempt unioni-
zation. I would propose a test based upon ownership in combination with con-
trol. Although there is obviously further work to be done in refining this test,
guidance is available in the securities law area. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(1989) (interpreting the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982). Rule 405
defines "control" as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise").
353. There is some precedent in state-public sector bargaining laws and in
the labor laws of other countries (particularly Western Europe and Canada)
for the notion that managerial and supervisory employees should be afforded
the right to bargain with their employers. See Rabban, supra note 148, at 1781
nn.13 & 14; Rabban, supra note 229 at 692 n.7. An extended discussion of
these analogous laws is beyond the scope of this Article.
354. See, e.g., Rabban, supra note 148, at 1781 (accepting incorporation of
divided loyalty theories into positive law and acknowledging the need for divi-
sion between managers and workers, but proposing that distinction be made
between managerial and non-managerial professionals on the basis of scholarly
analysis indicating that line should be drawn to include professionals who per-
form operational rather than bureaucratic functions); Osborne, The Need for
Legislation After Yeshiva, 9 J. L. & EDUC. 465, 476-77 (1980) (arguing that a
decision by Congress to simply return to pre-Yeshiva assumptions-that
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complete rethinking of our conception of the composition of
"labor," a restructuring of the labor laws and, ultimately, the
workplace.355 The hierarchical organization of the workplace,
which reflects the class hierarchy in society generally, has been
reinforced and legitimated by the NLRA.35 5Attempts to draw
the line between "employees" and "supervisors," or between
"professionals" and "managers," have resulted in such a strati-
fication of the laboring class that labor no longer has any real
power. Restructuring the workplace to make room for indus-
trial democracy thus requires a new definition of "employee"
that will allow unions to regain a foothold.
In sum, if we are to begin to close the vast gap that pres-
ently exists between workers and the elite, we must construct a
new dividing line between capital and labor that reconstitutes
the laboring class and maximizes the capability of collective
strength. As the statistics discussed earlier in this Article sug-
gest,35 7 there exists such a concentration of wealth among the
capital-owning class that even if all who labor organized, there
still would be greater power on the owners' side. Furthermore,
the concentration of wealth, especially when taken in combina-
tion with a failure of industrial democracy, seriously under-
faculty may bargain collectively where a majority of the faculty members are
in favor - would reap big dividends by avoiding expensive litigation, clarifying
and instilling certainty in the law, and affording employees the benefits of the
NLRA through collective bargaining); Grenig, The Implications of NLRB v.
Yeshiva University, 9 J. L. & EDuC. 479, 487 (1980)(calling for congressional
action to overrule Yeshiva); Comment, NLRB v. Yeshiva University: Faculty
As Managerial Employees Under the NLRA, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 63, 72-73 (1981)
(arguing that Congress should amend the definition of "supervisor" in the
NLRA to exclude faculty).
Some writers, although critical of the assumptions underlying the legal
boundaries between labor and management, have stopped short of suggesting
where, exactly, the line should be drawn. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 5, at 172-
73. Like Stone, I embrace the "constitutive" effect of the NLRA that facili-
tates the creation of the entity known as organized labor and empowers work-
ers. See id. at 82-85, 172. I, too, question the assumptions in the constitutive
features of the labor laws that limit worker participation. See id at 121. Un-
like Stone, however, I have chosen to focus on one of the structural barriers in
the NLRA to worker participation - the exclusion of middle managers - and
to suggest a concrete step toward eliminating that barrier.
355. Because my proposal is of a restructuring nature, rather than a new
idea that would affect only the functioning of the system, some may view it as
"dangerous." See E. ROGERS & F. SHOEMAKER, supra note 57, at 340 (contend-
ing that the elite, who maintain a vested interest in the status quo, sometimes
characterize structural innovations as "dangerous" to influence public opinion
against change).
356. See supra notes 93-168 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 10.
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mines our system of political democracy.358 The increasing
concentration of control by the wealthy over the avenues of
communication, including the electronic and print media359 ex-
acerbates the problem because the media is "a primary factor in
determining the significance of events and the bounds of polit-
ical discourse. '360
B. THE PROPOSAL
Three deceptively simple amendments could eliminate the
NLRA's reinforcement of the stratification of the laboring
classes. First, the Act's definition of the term "employee"
should be amended to delete the exclusion of "supervisors." 36'
Second, Congress should legislatively overrule three trouble-
some Supreme Court cases interpreting the NLRA: Bell Aero-
space36 2 (excluding managerial employees from coverage),
Yeshiva University3 6a (refining this definition), and Hendricks
County3 4 (excluding confidential employees with a labor
nexus from coverage).
Finally, to promote solidarity at the most basic level, sec-
tion 9(b)(1) should be eliminated from the Act.3a6 Section
9(b)(1) provides that the Board shall not certify a unit of pro-
fessional and nonprofessional employees unless a majority of
the professional employees vote for inclusion.366 Instead, the
358. See Willborn, supra note 56, at 742 (stating that industrial democracy
has failed; any new approach to labor relations must begin with the assump-
tion that the broader political process and labor relations are intimately
connected).
359. See Atleson, supra note 9, at 863 (arguing that the media, accessible
only to those with deep pockets, is controlled by fewer and fewer owners with
more and more similar values).
360. Id. The elite are constantly engaged in the process of "screening out"
innovations entailing consequences that threaten to disturb the status quo, and
so threaten a loss of position for the elite. E. ROGERs & F. SHOEMAKER, supra
note 57, at 340. The media is a powerful tool in this process.
361. See NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). This could be accom-
plished by deleting the words "or any individual employed as a supervisor" in
section 2(3) of the Act. Id Section 2(11) of the Act, defining the term "super-
visor," would then no longer be necessary.
362. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text
(discussing Bell Aerospace).
363. 444 U.S. 672 (1980). See supra notes 129-42 and accompanying text
(discussing Yeshiva University).
364. 454 U.S. 170 (1981). See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text
(discussing Hendricks County).
365. Section 2(12) of the Act, defining the term "professional," would then
not be necessary either.
366. NLRA § 9(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1988). Nor should any new
1016 [Vol. 74:953
LABOR LAW
Board should be permitted to apply its usual "community of in-
terest" standard to determine unit composition.36 7 Restrictions
on the Board's authority to perform this task embody assump-
tions that there is something ontologically unique about certain
classes of laborers. Perpetuation of this notion of difference
would operate as a continuing barrier to labor solidarity.
Capital is, of course, entitled to representatives at the bar-
gaining table who will pursue ownership's interests zealously.
To ensure loyalty at the deepest level and avoid conflicts of in-
terest where they affect most directly the collective bargaining
process, owners could utilize "hired guns," or independent con-
tractors,3s6 to bargain on their behalf with the unions repre-
senting their employees. Day-to-day management of labor
relations matters could still be accomplished by employees, be-
cause there is simply no reason to assume that workers will be-
come poor supervisors or managers if they are encouraged to
unionize. If supervisors and managers were disloyal or failed to
perform their jobs, they - like any other employee - could be
disciplined or discharged under existing law for just cause.36 9
The remaining pages address in more detail the ways in
which my proposal would enhance worker solidarity, and pave
the way for workers to empower themselves.
C. DRAWING A NEW LINE WOULD ENCOURAGE WORKER
SOLIDARITY
Current law encourages middle-level employees to con-
tinue to accept their categorization as separate from the rank
provisions be inserted requiring a majority vote by supervisors, managers, or
confidential employees for inclusion in a unit. Such provisions would simply
underscore the segregation of middle-level employees from the rank and file
without any showing of an actual difference in their interests in that particu-
lar workplace.
367. See, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 185-87, 191 (1958)(applying
community of interest standard, Board included 9 nonprofessional employees
in unit with 233 professional employees; Board's order exceeded its statutory
authority because it failed to adhere to requirements of section 9(b)(1)). See
supra note 227.
368. The "hired guns" could be either professional negotiators or attorneys.
In fact, many large employers currently utilize a professional collective bar-
gaining staff. See PRESSURES IN TODAY'S WORKPLACE, supra note 8, at 26, 28;
see also Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Pros-
pectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 441 n.16 (1984) (describ-
ing employers' use of consultants and noting most are lawyers).
369. See NLRB v. Local Union No.1229, International Bhd. of Elec. Work-




and file by affording them a separate remedy (wrongful dis-
charge) not generally available to unionized workers. Thus,
middle-level employees remain isolated, "cling[ing] to a sense of
being an educated elite rather than [being] workers." 370 They
have internalized the law's conception of the unionized worker
as helpless, not possessing any capacity to learn or generate
knowledge, and possessing no autonomous interest in work as a
means of fulfillment and self-realization.3 7 1 Rejecting the role
of the "employee" for themselves, they assume the mutually
exclusive role of manager, adopting the more attractive "ideol-
ogy of individualism," which teaches that a good education,
hard work, and careful saving should result in success at work
and in life.3 7 2 Under this ideology, poverty and powerlessness
are the result of individual failures, not collective traps.3
73
Consequently, individual action, rather than collective action, is
the means for escaping those traps.
Furthermore, developing wrongful discharge doctrine,
which was once necessary only to fill the gap in protection left
by the NLRA, now threatens to undermine collective bargain-
ing. Unionized employees who observe the damage remedies
available on an individual basis to successful wrongful dis-
charge plaintiffs 74 attempt in increasing numbers to take ad-
vantage of state law remedies in addition to seeking redress
under their collective bargaining agreements. 375 The Supreme
370. See P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 62; see
also Feldman Book Review, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1986) (reviewing T.
KocHAN, CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERIcAN LABOR (1985))
(presenting essay's argument that professional workers are less organized be-
cause of a lack of desire to join unions).
371. See The Bitter and the Sweet, supra note 104, at 117. As Rabban has
pointed out, even labor law scholars assumed that the NLRA was designed to
cover only those -employees who are essentially powerless and exploited at
work. Rabban, supra note 147, at 1791 n.62.
372. See P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 37. Fur-
thermore, because the middle fraction of the laboring class lives in relative
economic comfort, it remains committed to the preservation of the status quo.
Id. at 62.
373. Id. at 37.
374. A 1988 Rand Corporation study of 120 wrongful discharge cases that
went to trial in California between 1980 and 1986 revealed that 67.5% of plain-
tiffs prevailed; they were awarded an average of $646,855. Approximately 40%
of the awards were for punitive damages. Geyelin, supra note 260, at B-1, col.3.
375. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 401
(1988) (holding union member's claim for retaliatory discharge not pre-
empted); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 388-91, 396 (1987) (holding
that managers demoted to non-management positions covered by collective
bargaining agreement may sue for breach of independent promises made while
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Court has retreated significantly from its earlier stance on pre-
emption to allow thisY'36 Worse, recent cases evidence a trend
toward employee reliance on state law remedies to the exclu-
sion of collective bargaining.377
My proposed solution breaks down the legal barriers be-
tween middle-level employees and the rank and file, encourag-
ing them to rely on one another for support. In my paradigm
of the workplace, hierarchy would be minimized, and the hos-
tility of many middle-level employees for those laboring 'e-
neath" them would be replaced with respect. There would
again be room for workers to create the cooperative work ethic
that predated Taylorism.378
In addition, organized labor would receive a sorely needed
injection of resources. The symbolic value of encouraging man-
agers and supervisors to organize would be tremendous. Pro-
fessional employees and other white-collar workers would
observe first-hand the benefits of unionization, and could con-
tribute financial resources and knowledge to the collective ef-
fort. Further, unionization efforts directed at the rank and file
would receive a needed boost. This is particularly true in the
service industries that currently dominate our economy.379
Rank-and-file service employees are now in the same position
as were blue collar workers several decades ago. The low-
skilled nature of many service industry jobs ensures low pay
and minimal job security. Consequently, rank-and-file turnover
rates are high, and unions have been largely unsuccessful in or-
they were in managerial positions). See generally Yonover, Preemption of
State Tort Remedies for Wrongful Discharge in the Aftermath of Lingle v.
Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S.D.L. REv. 63
(1989).
376. See Yonover, supra note 375, at 92.
377. See, e.g., Overby v. Chevron USA, 884 F.2d 470, 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding employee's state law claim for wrongful discharge not preempted
when collective bargaining agreement had expired). Contra Derrico v.
Sheehan Emergency Hosp., 844 F.2d 22, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that em-
ployee's implied contract claim based upon expired collective bargaining agree-
ment is preempted, because exposing employer to liability at state law for
breach of contract would alter the balance of power in the labor-management
relationship following expiration of the labor agreement).
378. See D. MONTGOiERY, supra note 188, at 9-27 (noting that early indus-
trial workers were autonomous craftsmen who assumed collective control over
productive processes; they operated as a unit that contracted with the em-
ployer to do the whole job).
379. See Excerpts from Pastoral Letter on Economic Affairs Adopted by
National Confference of Catholic Bishops, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 221, at F-
1 (Nov. 17, 1986) (stating that by 1990, service industries will employ 72% of
the labor force).
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ganizing service employees.380 In contrast, managers - who
are likely to stay longer because of the higher pay commensu-
rate with their greater responsibilities, might be more receptive
to unionization efforts.
Finally, industrial and political democracy might at last be
within the grasp of workers. As power in this country becomes
more centralized, the major political decisions are made by a
handful of elite, most of whom are entirely inaccessible to us as
individuals. As a collective, however, workers might have a
strong enough voice to grab a share of the decision-making
power - first in the workplace, and ultimately in the larger
political arena. Such collective strength, however, requires soli-
darity of all employees, not merely those at the bottom of the
hierarchy.
CONCLUSION
The decline of unionism is undeniable-s 1 As unionism has
declined, stratification of the laboring class has increased. La-
bor's diminished ability to protect the interests of workers is
apparent. The ramifications of labor's decline have been cam-
ouflaged, however, by the development of wrongful discharge
doctrine and the enactment of limited federal statutory protec-
tions for workers not covered by the NLRA. I have argued that
these methods of protecting middle-level employees operate
only to further undermine collective bargaining and the utiliza-
tion by workers of their collective strength. Because of their
individual character, they serve to promote the individualistic
ideology the elite has marketed to workers.
The immediate result of the failure of collective bargaining
is the perpetuation of a workplace that is organized in a hierar-
chical fashion. That hierarchical structure, founded in
Tayloristic conceptions of "management" and "employees,"
breeds alienation in the workplace and frustrates the achieve-
ment of NLRA goals, which include industrial peace, worker
empowerment, and industrial democracy.
The NLRA's system of collective organization and bargain-
ing is the best means for combatting alienation, achieving
worker empowerment, and advancing industrial democracy.
Collective representation and bargaining, because of its poten-
380. See id.; see also M. REYNOLDS, PoWER AND PRIVILEGE: LABOR UNIONS
IN AMERICA 260 (1984) (stating that unions have been largely unsuccessful in
organizing high-technology service area employees).
381. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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tial to respond immediately to the needs of particular workers
in a particular workplace,382 provides the most effective route
to ensure meaningful worker participation in workplace deci-
sion-making. A narrow definition of the "employee" eligible
for NLRA protection, however, limits the effectiveness of col-
lective organization and bargaining under current labor law
doctrine. Consequently, I have proposed a restructuring of the
NLRA that would eliminate this legal barrier to unification of
the laboring class. If my proposal were implemented, Congress
would pave the way for a resurgence in labor strength and in
the vitality of collective organization and collective bargaining.
The execution of the legal blueprint I have suggested rests,
ultimately, with workers. It is up to labor unions to find new,
more effective ways of persuading us to think about our simi-
larities as laborers, rather than about our differences. Collec-
tive strength - deployed through the vehicles of the labor
union and collective bargaining under the NLRA - provides
the best hope for "escaping our perpetual search for identity,
economic security, and control,"' 83 and ultimately, for ensuring
worker empowerment.
382. See St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half
Century, 61 CH.-KENT L. REV. 631, 661-62 (1985).
383. P. KING, K. MAYNARD & D. WOODYARD, supra note 10, at 206.
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